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Abstract 
∎ Since the Arab Spring of 2011, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have 
been pursuing an increasingly active foreign and security policy and 
have emerged as a leading regional power. 
∎ The UAE sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a serious threat to regime sta-
bility at home, and is fighting the organisation and its affiliated groups 
throughout the Arab world. 
∎ The UAE’s preferred partners in regional policy are authoritarian rulers 
who take a critical view of political Islam and combat the Muslim Brother-
hood. 
∎ The new Emirati regional policy is also directed against Iranian expansion 
in the Middle East. Yet the anti-Iranian dimension of Emirati foreign 
policy is considerably less pronounced than its anti-Islamist dimension. 
∎ The UAE wants to gain control of sea routes from the Gulf of Aden to the 
Red Sea. Since the Yemen conflict began in 2015, it has established a 
small maritime empire there. 
∎ The rise of the UAE to a regional power has made the country a more im-
portant and simultaneously a more problematic policy partner for Ger-
many and Europe. 
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Issues and Conclusions 
Regional Power United Arab Emirates. 
Abu Dhabi Is No Longer Saudi Arabia’s 
Junior Partner 
Since the Arab Spring of 2011, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) have been pursuing an increasingly 
active foreign and security policy and have become 
an important regional power. Together with Saudi 
Arabia they intervened in Bahrain in March 2011, 
when the Khalifa family feared that a Shiite protest 
movement might develop into a threat to its rule. In 
July 2013, the Emirates – again in conjunction with 
Riyadh – supported the coup d’état of the Egyptian 
military led by General Abd al- Fattah al-Sisi. In spring 
2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE launched a war 
against the Houthi rebels in Yemen; in June 2017 
the two neighbours imposed a blockade of Qatar. 
The Emirates also intervened in the conflict in Libya 
on the side of General Khalifa Haftar, who has been 
trying to unite the country under himself since 2014. 
Since 2017, the Emirates have benefited from good 
relations with the Trump administration, which 
resolutely supports the regional policy of the Emirati 
leadership and, like the latter, pursues an aggressive 
anti-Iranian line. It was not until mid-2019 that dis-
agreements became apparent, when the Emirates 
opted for a more cautious policy towards Iran. 
All these events demonstrate that the UAE is no 
longer Saudi Arabia’s junior partner, as was the case 
up to 2011 and partly beyond. Since then, there have 
been more and more reports that joint foreign policy 
projects between the two partners (such as the Yemen 
war and the blockade of Qatar) were initiated by Abu 
Dhabi. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Emir-
ates have ceased to be a secondary player in the 
Middle East, unable to compete with regional heavy-
weights Egypt, Turkey and Iran. Rather, the country 
is now exerting influence far beyond its own borders. 
Most recently, it demonstrated by its partial with-
drawal from Yemen in 2019 that it is capable of pur-
suing an independent course vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia 
as well. 
However, these observations raise the question of 
what the guidelines and priorities of the Emirates’ 
foreign policy are. Do the various activities of the UAE 
vis-à-vis Qatar, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and in the con-
flict with Iran follow a strategy, or are they more or 
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less opportunistic reactions to the crisis in the Arab 
world since 2011? The thesis put forward in this study 
is that the Emirates’ new regional policy, despite many 
reactive elements, is characterised by three clearly 
recognisable guidelines: 
∎ First, the UAE is fighting Islamists in the region 
because they have pinpointed the Muslim Brother-
hood – the largest and most important movement 
of political Islam in the Arab world – as a serious 
domestic threat to regime stability. The leadership 
in Abu Dhabi is convinced that the transnational 
structure of the Islamist group is dangerous and 
that, if the Brotherhood gained power in countries 
like Egypt, it would try to mobilise its followers in 
the Gulf States and especially in the UAE against 
their governments. This is why the Emirati leader-
ship supports authoritarian governments or mili-
tary forces in Egypt, Libya and – albeit to a lesser 
extent – Sudan. 
∎ Second, the new Emirati regional policy is directed 
against Iranian expansion in the Middle East. Since 
2015, when the UAE and Saudi Arabia started a 
war against the Houthi rebels, who are loosely 
allied with Iran, Yemen has been the main scene 
of this conflict from Abu Dhabi’s perspective. How-
ever, the anti-Iranian dimension of the Emirates’ 
foreign policy is much less pronounced than its 
aversion to the Islamists. 
∎ Third, Abu Dhabi is very interested in controlling 
the sea routes from the Gulf of Aden to the Red 
Sea. The UAE has taken over several Yemeni ports 
and islands since 2015 and has established bases in 
Assab in Eritrea and Berbera in Somaliland. It has 
thus established a small maritime empire between 
the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea, and established 
itself as a regional power in the south-western Ara-
bian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. 
The priorities of the leadership in Abu Dhabi 
became very clear in July 2019, when the UAE with-
drew the majority of its troops from Yemen, leaving 
most positions to local allies. This move was largely 
motivated by the UAE’s concerns over a further esca-
lation of the conflict with Iran. In May and June, the 
Iranians had sabotaged and hijacked oil tankers – 
some of them near the Emirati coast – and thus 
demonstrated the Emirates’ vulnerability. This was 
followed by a cautious relaxation of relations with 
Iran, while the fight against the Islamists and their 
supporters in the region continued unabated. 
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Three main developments inside the Emirates have 
initiated this shift towards an active and often aggres-
sive regional policy in the UAE. First, the rise of 
Mohammed Bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the Crown Prince 
of Abu Dhabi, to strong man of the federation. Since 
2003 Bin Zayed has become the main architect of the 
Emirates’ regional power politics. Second, the impact 
of an internal UAE power shift, as a result of which 
the more commercially orientated Dubai has lost 
influence and Abu Dhabi has dominated decision-
making processes in foreign and security policy. And 
third, since 2011 the Emirati government has relied 
on domestic repression, such that it no longer has 
to fear internal resistance to its foreign policy. 
The Ascent of Mohammed Bin Zayed 
Mohammed Bin Zayed is the undisputed leader in 
Abu Dhabi and the UAE. The fact that he was able 
to assume this position is primarily due to his father 
Zayed Bin Sultan al-Nahyan, the long-time Emir 
of Abu Dhabi and President of the UAE (officiated 
1971–2004), who appointed him deputy crown 
prince in November 2003. When the father died 
a year later, his eldest son Khalifa Bin Zayed (born 
1948) succeeded him in both offices, and Mohammed 
(born 1961) became crown prince. A possible reason 
for Zayed preferring his third eldest son (of a total 
of 19) was the lobbying by his mother, Fatima Bint 
Mubarak al-Ketbi, who is thought to have been the 
former ruler’s favourite wife and to have had special 
influence over him.1 
Khalifa suffered from serious health problems 
early on, and Mohammed Bin Zayed quickly took over 
 
1 “UAE Succession Update: The Post-Zayed Scenario” (cable 
04ABUDHABI3410_a), 28 September 2004, WikiLeaks, https:// 
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI3410_a.html 
(accessed 17 January 2020). 
day-to-day business. Since December 2004, he has 
headed the Executive Council (al-Majlis al-Tanfidhi), 
Abu Dhabi’s central decision-making body. From this 
position, he has accelerated the emirate’s modernisa-
tion.2 After suffering a stroke in January 2014, Khalifa 
withdrew from public life. He will not return to the 
political stage, so it is only a matter of time before 
Mohammed Bin Zayed succeeds his brother as Emir 
of Abu Dhabi. It is an open question as to whether 
he can also take over the presidency of the UAE.3 
Mohammed Bin Zayed considers himself a military 
man. After his training at the British Military Acad-
emy Sandhurst, he became commander of the UAE 
Air Force in the late 1980s, and chief of the UAE Gen-
eral Staff in 1993. His most important task in the 
1990s was the integration of the Emirati armed forces, 
since it was not until 1996 that Dubai’s and Ras 
al-Khaimah’s troops, the Dubai Defence Force and the 
Ras al-Khaimah National Guard, became a part of the 
UAE’s joint military.4 After the 1990–1991 Gulf War, 
the UAE very purposely expanded its armed forces. 
It formed a small but increasingly professional and 
powerful military force of 63,000 troops, thus laying 
the foundation for a more active foreign policy from 
2011 onwards. Within the joint armed forces, the 
Presidential Guard (Haras al-Ri’asa), which was only 
established in 2010, and the Air Force, which is con-
sidered the strongest in the region after the Israeli 
one, stand out. The army has limited operational 
 
2 For details of the function and composition of the Execu-
tive Council, see Christopher Davidson, Abu Dhabi: Oil and 
Beyond (London, 2009), 124. 
3 Simon Henderson and Kristian C. Ulrichsen, MBZ and the 
Future Leadership of the United Arab Emirates, Policy Note 65 
(Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, July 2019), 4, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ 
uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote65-HendersonCoates.pdf 
(accessed 17 January 2020). 
4 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Power, 
Politics, and Policymaking (London and New York, 2017), 63–65. 
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capability due to restricted recruitment opportunities 
(the Emirates only have about one million citizens), 
but the shortage of personnel is partly compensated 
by the recruitment of mercenaries.5 
Since the mid-2000s, Bin Zayed has 
been responsible for the UAE’s 
security and foreign policy. 
In 2005, the crown prince was promoted to UAE 
deputy defence minister. In fact, however, he acts 
as head of the ministry, since the actual incumbent, 
Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Emir of 
Dubai (who also serves as UAE prime minister), limits 
himself to ceremonial duties, focuses on administer-
ing Dubai and its business interests, and shows no 
interest in security policy. Since the mid-2000s, it is 
therefore primarily Bin Zayed who has been respon-
sible for UAE security and defence policy, as well as 
its foreign policy. He benefits from good relations 
with Mohammed Bin Rashid.6 
The crown prince’s most important allies in Abu 
Dhabi are a group of five full brothers, who are also 
called Bani Fatima (Tribe of Fatima, after their 
mother). From 2004 onwards, the power of this part 
of the family increased at the expense of twelve half-
brothers, who from then on were only marginally 
represented in Abu Dhabi politics. Besides Moham-
med Bin Zayed, the Bani Fatima consists of his 
brothers Hamdan, Hazza, Tahnoun, Mansour and 
Abdullah. All five have benefited from the rise of 
their full brother; Mansour (born in 1970) is consid-
ered particularly influential. Since 2009 he has served 
as deputy prime minister of the UAE and at the same 
time as minister for presidential affairs. Abdullah 
(born 1972) was appointed UAE foreign minister in 
2006. Tahnoun (b. 1968) has served as national secu-
rity advisor to the UAE since 2015. Hazza (b. 1963) 
has been the emir’s security advisor since 2006, with 
a focus on internal security. Hamdan was formerly 
deputy prime minister, but seems to have lost his 
importance.7 
 
5 Mark Mazzetti and Emily B. Hager, “Secret Desert Force 
Set up by Blackwater’s Founder”, The New York Times, 14 May 
2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/ 
15prince.html (accessed 17 January 2020). 
6 On the good relations between Bin Zayed and Bin Rashid, 
see “UAE Succession Update: The Post-Zayed Scenario” (cable 
04ABUDHABI3410_a) (see note 1). 
7 Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates (see note 4), 70. On the 
early careers of Hamdan, Hazza, Tahnoun, Mansour and 
By the end of the 2000s, Bin Zayed had consolidated 
his power in Abu Dhabi. At that time he was already 
steering the Emirates’ domestic and foreign policy. 
Apart from his military background, his most promi-
nent characteristics were his distrust of Islamists of 
all kinds and his hostility towards Iran. In US embassy 
reports of the 2000s, published by WikiLeaks, Moham-
med Bin Zayed and his brothers are repeatedly quoted 
as rejecting the Muslim Brotherhood. The crown 
prince was apparently concerned above all about the 
stability of the Emirates, which in his view is threat-
ened by this transnationally active organisation. In 
2004 he is even said to have stated that the Emirates 
were at “war with the Muslim Brotherhood”.8 Bin 
Zayed’s position vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran 
has also been the subject of several reports. His hos-
tility culminated in a 2007 statement in which he 
openly called for a military strike against Iranian 
targets.9 Both causes became constants of the crown 
prince’s policy and gained in importance from 2011 
onwards. 
The Centralisation of Power in Abu Dhabi 
After 2009, Mohammed Bin Zayed and his brothers 
also benefited from an internal Emirates power shift, 
which facilitated centralising the foreign and security 
policy decision-making process in Abu Dhabi. The 
reason for this was the relative loss of influence of 
Dubai, which had directed the fate of the UAE during 
the first four decades of the federation’s existence on 
almost equal terms with Abu Dhabi. 
The United Arab Emirates is a federation of seven 
Emirates that are independent, at least in theory. 
Since the founding of the UAE, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 
the two largest, most populous and most resource-
rich emirates, have dominated. Abu Dhabi has had 
advantages from the very beginning, as it has con-
siderably more oil than Dubai. Oil production in 
Dubai peaked as early as 1991 at 410,000 barrels per 
 
Abdullah see Davidson, Abu Dhabi (see note 2), 99–100 and 
104–105. 
8 “UAE Minimizing Influence of Islamist Extremists” (cable 
04ABUDHABI4061_a), 10 November 2004, WikiLeaks, https:// 
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI4061_a.html 
(accessed 17 January 2020). 
9 “U/S Burns’ January 22 Meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince and UAE Foreign Minister” (cable 07ABUDHABI97_a), 
24 January 2007, WikiLeaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ 
cables/07ABUDHABI97_a.html (accessed 17 January 2020). 
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day; it has since declined steadily.10 Abu Dhabi, 
on the other hand, has more than 90 percent of the 
country’s oil reserves, the seventh largest in the 
world. Even when the UAE was founded, Abu Dhabi 
was already producing significantly more oil than all 
the other emirates combined. The fact that Abu Dhabi 
was also responsible for most of the UAE’s budget in 
the early days had a direct impact on the balance of 
power between the two emirates. Since 1971, Abu 
Dhabi has provided the president of the UAE, who 
is elected every five years by the seven rulers, and is 
allowed to hold six ministerial posts, including the 
ministries of the interior, foreign affairs and infor-
mation. Dubai, on the other hand, has appointed the 
vice president, the prime minister and three ministers 
(defence, finance and economics) since the founding 
of the state. The other emirates provide the remaining 
eight ministers.11 They accept the unequal distribu-
tion of power so as to secure a share of Abu Dhabi’s 
oil revenues. 
The Abu Dhabi leadership has always worked to 
centralise power as much as possible, while Dubai has 
led the resistance against such tendencies. Despite the 
unequal distribution of oil revenues, Dubai was able 
to hold its own against the largest member of the 
federation for a long time because it adopted an alter-
native development model early on. Since the 1960s, 
the emirate had been the most important trading 
centre in the southern Gulf; through investments in 
logistics infrastructure in the 1990s and 2000s, it has 
developed into the commercial capital of the entire 
Middle East. The port of Jebel Ali, opened in 1979, is 
the largest container transhipment centre between 
China and Europe; Dubai Airport is the third largest 
in the world in terms of passenger traffic (2018); and 
the city is the region’s financial centre.12 In the 2000s, 
Dubai experienced an unprecedented construction 
boom. The emirate’s leaders have attempted to turn 
Dubai into a global brand and attract foreign inves-
tors with spectacular projects such as the Burj Khalifa 
skyscraper. 
 
10 It is expected that Dubai’s reserves will be completely 
depleted by around 2030, see “Oil in Dubai: History and 
Timeline”, Gulf News, 4 February 2010, https://gulfnews. 
com/business/energy/oil-in-dubai-history--timeline-1.578333 
(accessed 17 January 2020). 
11 Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates (see note 4), 54. 
12 Jim Krane, City of Gold. Dubai and the Dream of Capitalism 
(New York, 2009), 80. 
Over the last decade, UAE policy has 
been increasingly shaped by security 
considerations. 
Dubai’s policy continues to bear the stamp of 
Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, who, as crown 
prince, became the de facto ruler of the emirate from 
1995 onwards, before ascending the throne in 2006. 
At first, it seemed that the rise of Mohammed Bin 
Zayed and Mohammed Bin Rashid went hand in hand, 
since the ruler of Dubai, as prime minister and vice-
president of the UAE, confidently insisted on a strong 
role in the emirate’s domestic and foreign policy, 
and brought important advisors into key positions.13 
Dubai, like Abu Dhabi, benefited from high revenues 
from oil exports during the long period of high prices 
that began in 2002 and did not end until the summer 
of 2014. However, the boom in Dubai came to an end 
in 2009, when the consequences of the 2008 financial 
crisis affected the state-owned company Dubai World, 
which had invested primarily in the desert city’s most 
prominent real estate projects, and thus accumulated 
debts of $59 billion. Dubai is said to have had debts of 
at least $80 billion at the time.14 Only a cash injection 
from Abu Dhabi of $20 billion saved Dubai World 
from insolvency.15 There is no public knowledge of 
any specific quid-pro-quos or other demands by Abu 
Dhabi, but this assumption of debt further tipped the 
balance of power in the Emirates in its favour. The 
UAE’s policy was increasingly determined by security 
considerations, with trade and economy having to 
take a back seat. While there is some evidence that 
Mohammed Bin Rashid was critical of key policy deci-
sions made by Bin Zayed, such as the boycott of Qatar 
in 2017,16 he no longer had the power to impose his 
foreign policy perspective. 
 
13 Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates (see note 4), 70. 
14 Robert F. Worth, Heather Timmons and Landon 
Thomas, Jr., “Crisis Puts Focus on Dubai’s Complex Relation-
ship with Abu Dhabi”, The New York Times, 29 November 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/business/global/ 
30dubai.html (accessed 17 January 2020). 
15 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Evolving Power Dynamics in 
the United Arab Emirates”, Baker Institute Blog, 1 March 2016, 
http://blog.bakerinstitute.org/2016/03/01/evolving-power-
dynamics-in-the-united-arab-emirates/ (accessed 17 January 
2020). 
16 Henderson and Ulrichsen, MBZ and the Future Leadership 
of the United Arab Emirates (see note 3), 9. 
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The Authoritarian Security State 
Since 2011–2012, the centralisation of power in 
Abu Dhabi, and more importantly in the person of 
Mohammed Bin Zayed, has been accompanied by a 
trend towards a comprehensive and uncompromising 
authoritarianism of the kind that can also be seen in 
post-Arab-Spring Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain. In 
the UAE, this intensified (though mostly non-violent) 
repression primarily affects the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which until 2012 was the only organised opposition 
in the Emirates, and which is regarded by Mohammed 
Bin Zayed as the most serious threat to domestic po-
litical stability. Now that the Islamists and the main 
liberal voices in the country have been eliminated, 
the crown prince no longer has to fear public oppo-
sition to his decisions. 
Al-Islah (“reform”), as the Muslim Brotherhood 
offshoot in the Emirates calls itself, benefited from 
cautious government support at the time of its crea-
tion in the 1970s. However, relations between the 
group and the UAE leadership deteriorated in the 
1980s and 1990s because the Brotherhood expanded 
its social influence and developed into a serious op-
position movement. An Emirati author even called 
the UAE education system and judiciary a “state 
within a state”, since the Muslim Brotherhood domi-
nated student councils and professional lawyers’ and 
teachers’ associations.17 The Islamists also became 
politically more active beyond these areas, not only 
protesting against the Westernisation of the Emirates, 
the loss of indigenous values, and widespread corrup-
tion, but also pushing for political reforms. The orga-
nisation’s activities were therefore already being 
curtailed in the 1990s.18 
Following his appointment as deputy crown prince 
in 2003, Mohammed Bin Zayed addressed the prob-
lem posed by al-Islah, and Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
tightened their grip. To counter their influence over 
the education sector, Muslim Brothers who worked 
there were transferred to other posts, dismissed, or 
even imprisoned in the years that followed.19 Overall, 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s reach was restricted, 
 
17 Sultan Al Qassemi, “The Brothers and the Gulf”, Foreign 
Policy (online), 14 December 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 
2012/12/14/the-brothers-and-the-gulf/ (accessed 17 January 
2020). 
18 Courtney Freer, Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies (Oxford, 2018), 103. 
19 Ibid., 167. 
though initially without any large-scale persecution. 
This initial restraint was probably mainly due to the 
continued protection of the Islamists by the ruler 
of Ras al-Khaimah, Saqr Bin Mohammed al-Qasimi 
(ruled 1948–2010), who enjoyed special respect 
among the other sheikhs because he was the last 
surviving representative of the founding generation 
of the Emirates. When Saqr al-Qasimi died in 2010, 
Mohammed Bin Zayed finally had carte blanche for 
a crackdown. The occasion was the Arab Spring of 
2011. 
It was above all the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt that prompted Abu Dhabi’s leaders to take a 
tougher line. The accusation repeatedly made against 
the Islamists in the Emirates was that they belonged 
to a transnational network that operated in secret and 
were loyal to its supreme leader in Egypt, not to the 
UAE.20 Nevertheless, the first measures taken by the 
government in 2011 did not affect al-Islah, but liberal 
reformers. In March 2011, 113 intellectuals petitioned 
Khalifa Bin Zayed and the other UAE emirs, demand-
ing broader political participation. Al-Islah members 
were among the signatories. In early April, five lead-
ing signatories of the petition – none of whom 
belonged to al-Islah – were arrested; in November 
2011, they were sentenced to several years’ imprison-
ment, but pardoned shortly thereafter (only to be re-
arrested later in some cases).21 
The crackdown on the Muslim 
Brotherhood is just one facet of Abu 
Dhabi’s efforts to quash any 
opposition within the UAE. 
Not until spring 2012, shortly after the Islamists 
had won the parliamentary elections in Egypt, did the 
persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood begin in all 
Emirates. In March, seven prominent al-Islah mem-
bers who had signed the petition were arrested; in 
April, Sultan Bin Kayed al-Qasimi, the al-Islah chair-
man, followed.22 By the end of 2012, the authorities 
had arrested 94 members of al-Islah, 69 of whom were 
sentenced in July 2013 to prison terms of between 
 
20 Al Qassemi, “The Brothers and the Gulf” (see note 17). 
21 Freer, Rentier Islamism (see note 18), 133. 
22 Simeon Kerr “UAE Islamist Detained in Ruler’s Palace”, 
Financial Times, 25 April 2012, https://www.ft.com/content/ 
f6aaa4cc-8e9e-11e1-ac13-00144feab49a (accessed 17 January 
2020). 
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seven and 15 years for an alleged coup attempt.23 
The prosecutor’s office claimed the country’s national 
security was being “threatened by a group with con-
nections to foreign organisations and machinations.”24 
The government also announced that the organisa-
tion had an armed wing and was planning a coup 
d’état to revive the caliphate. Further sentences 
against Emirati and Egyptian Muslim Brothers fol-
lowed, accompanied by a massive public campaign 
against al-Islah.25 
During this phase, the leadership in Abu Dhabi 
was focused on the complete destruction of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the Emirates. This became 
evident in November 2014 at the latest, when the 
UAE published a terrorism list on which al-Islah and 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were listed along-
side groups such as al-Qaida and “Islamic State” (IS) – 
even though in the case of al-Islah there were no 
indications of terrorist violence.26 Even the political 
activities of the organisation had always remained 
very moderate, and it was not working towards a 
coup d’état. Rather, the crackdown on al-Islah was a 
facet of Abu Dhabi’s efforts to quash any political 
opposition in the UAE. The Emirates’ security author-
ities used state-of-the-art surveillance technology to 
track down and silence even harmless critics; and the 
country’s intelligence services were greatly expanded.27
 
23 “UAE Sentences ‘Coup Plotters’ to Jail”, The Guardian, 
2 July 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
jul/02/uae-sentences-coup-plotters-jail (accessed 17 January 
2020). 
24 Quoted in Freer, Rentier Islamism (see note 18), 136. 
25 Ibid. 
26 “UAE Publishes List of Terrorist Organisations”, Gulf 
News, 15 November 2014, https://gulfnews.com/uae/ 
government/uae-publishes-list-of-terrorist-organisations-
1.1412895 (accessed 17 January 2020). 
27 David D. Kirkpatrick and Azam Ahmed, “Hacking a 
Prince, an Emir and a Journalist to Impress a Client”, The New 
York Times, 31 August 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
08/31/world/middleeast/hacking-united-arab-emirates-nso-
group.html; Jenna McLaughlin, “Deep Pockets, Deep Cover”, 
Foreign Policy (online), 21 December 2017, https:// foreign 
policy.com/2017/12/21/deep-pockets-deep-cover-the-uae-is-
paying-ex-cia-officers-to-build-a-spy-empire-in-the-gulf/ 
(both accessed 17 January 2020). 
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The most important constants of the UAE’s foreign 
and security policy are its alliances with the USA and 
Saudi Arabia. Although the Emirates have been acting 
more independently since 2011, the new policy would 
not be possible without a continued alliance with 
the USA, on whose protection the rich but small and 
sparsely populated country and its energy exports 
can count in the event of conflict. This alliance also 
remained intact when relations were clouded by the 
Emirati leadership’s dissatisfaction with the Obama 
administration policy on the Arab Spring and Iran. 
With the inauguration of President Donald Trump, 
the relationship quickly improved again because his 
administration, like the UAE, was committed to an 
anti-Iranian policy, and saw the Emirates as an 
important pillar of its Middle East policy. Alongside 
Israel and Saudi Arabia, the UAE is now the US’s 
closest ally in the Middle East. 
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, had already 
become a strategic partner in the Emirates’ new re-
gional policy during the Obama presidencies. Riyadh 
and Abu Dhabi have in fact been close allies since the 
formation of the UAE in 1971. But the young state 
remained a junior partner of Saudi Arabia until the 
2000s, generally following the policies of its bigger 
neighbour. This only changed with the rise of 
Mohammed Bin Zayed, who from 2011 increasingly 
pushed for decisive joint action in the region. He 
found a congenial partner in the Saudi Arabian 
Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud, who 
from January 2015 onwards gradually became the 
main leader of Saudi Arabian policy. In some cases 
(for example in Yemen and Qatar), the UAE leader-
ship seems to have been the driving force behind 
joint regional policy initiatives. 
The UAE and the USA 
The USA became the Emirates’ protective power in 
the 1980s. How necessary this alliance was for the 
continued existence of the UAE was apparent even 
at its founding. In November 1971, Iran used the 
opportunity offered by the British withdrawal from 
the Gulf region to take control of three strategically 
important islands near the Strait of Hormuz, which 
had until then been part of the Emirates’ territory: 
the two Tunb islands and Abu Musa. This event, 
among others, showed the Emiratis that they were 
dependent on protection by a foreign power since 
they found themselves in the neighbourhood of 
much stronger and often aggressive states, such as 
Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
This role was assumed by the USA from the 1980s 
onwards. It expanded its presence in the Persian Gulf 
after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 – which meant 
the loss of the Shah as its most important ally in the 
region – and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 
1980, and from then on also protected the UAE. How-
ever, the 1990–1991 Gulf War was a turning point in 
American-Emirati relations: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
on 2 August 1990 showed the UAE how vulnerable 
the smaller Gulf states were to military aggression by 
a neighbouring country. To protect themselves, the 
Emirates, like its neighbours, therefore endeavoured 
in the years that followed to expand the US presence 
on their territory. The UAE concluded a bilateral secu-
rity agreement with Washington in July 1994.28 The 
USA received long-term regulated access to Emirati 
air bases and ports, and in return (at least implicitly) 
promised to protect the UAE from external enemies. 
That the government in Abu Dhabi at the time still 
feared public criticism of its close ties with the USA 
(both domestically and from Iran) was shown above 
all by the fact that the text of the agreement remained 
secret at the Emirates’ request. 
 
28 Sami G. Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges 
and Prospects (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, March 2002), 20, https://publications. 
armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1495.pdf (accessed 17 January 
2020). 
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The UAE military has participated in 
every major US operation in the 
broader Middle East since 1991. 
While the UAE was initially one US ally among 
many in the Gulf, it became an increasingly impor-
tant partner in the 1990s and 2000s. This was due in 
part to the port of Jebel Ali, which developed into 
the US Navy’s most frequently used base outside the 
United States, and the Al Dhafra Air Force Base, 
which became key for US wars in the region. From 
the late 1990s onwards, the UAE also attempted to 
convince its ally of its relevance by cooperating on a 
broad and intensive basis. Thus, the Emirati military 
has participated in every major US mission in the 
broader Middle East since 1991: in the 1991 Gulf War 
and in the operations in Somalia in 1992; in Kosovo 
in 1999; in Afghanistan since 2003; in Libya in 2011; 
and in Syria (against IS) in 2014–2015. Only partici-
pation in the 2003 Iraq War was vehemently rejected 
by the Emirates.29 For the Emirati military, these 
numerous missions meant a constant learning pro-
cess, which has had a positive effect on its efficiency 
and professionalism. 
The UAE’s participation in the often controversial 
US military operations in Arab and Muslim countries 
has been an invaluable asset for the USA. It allowed 
Washington to state that at least one Arab-Muslim 
state was also involved in the action. Moreover, the 
government in Abu Dhabi sent not only its military, 
but also Emirati aid organisations, which tried to win 
over the population with large sums of money. An 
important example of this is Afghanistan, where the 
UAE has not only invested hundreds of millions of US 
dollars in humanitarian aid and development projects 
to stabilise the Afghan state, but has at times also 
provided a small contingent of special forces, which 
were deployed against the Taliban in the particularly 
dangerous south after 2003. Between 2012 and 2014, 
the Emirates deployed six F16 fighter planes to sup-
port ground operations.30 UAE units also remained in 
 
29 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States 
Has a Quiet, Potent Ally Nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’”, The 
Washington Post, 9 November 2014, https://wapo.st/2waDIWh 
(accessed 17 January 2020). 
30 Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for 
U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service 
[CRS], 1 November 2019), 15, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/ 
RS21852.pdf (accessed 17 January 2020). 
Afghanistan when most other US allies gradually 
withdrew their troops after 2014.31 
The UAE were particularly easy to win over for the 
fight against Islamist terrorists, because their leaders’ 
aversion to religious extremism also extended to this 
form of political Islam. This is why the Emirati Air 
Force participated in the US-led coalition against IS 
in Syria in 2014 and 2015, with Emirati fighter planes 
flying more attacks in those years than any other par-
ticipating country except the United States. Further-
more, the UAE made its bases available not only to 
the US, but also to France and Australia so that they 
could participate in the attacks.32 Only after the out-
break of the Yemen war in March 2015 did the UAE 
reduce its involvement in the fight against IS. 
In parallel with these campaigns, however, Emirati 
reservations emerged about US policy in the Middle 
East. Abu Dhabi already considered the 2003 Iraq war 
a serious mistake.33 Like the Saudi Arabian leader-
ship, the Emirati princes feared that the military 
intervention would increase Iran’s power in Iraq 
and/or trigger a civil war, both of which could have 
a destabilising effect on the region. When Shiite 
Islamists close to Iran won the 2005 Iraqi parliamen-
tary elections and a bloody civil war broke out in Feb-
ruary 2006, the UAE saw its predictions confirmed, 
but had no opportunity to influence the situation in 
the country. Its main concern now was that a pre-
mature American withdrawal would aggravate the 
situation, so it limited itself to urging the US admin-
istration to refrain from a rapid withdrawal as pro-
posed by the Baker-Hamilton Commission in 2006.34 
A turning point in the UAE’s 
perception of US policy was the 
fall of President Mubarak of Egypt in 
early 2011. 
However, the turning point in the Emirati percep-
tion of US policy was the overthrow of Hosni Muba-
 
31 See, e.g., “UAE to Boost Troop Presence in Afghanistan 
for Training: Officials”, Reuters, 8 June 2018, https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-emirates/uae-to-boost-
troop-presence-in-afghanistan-for-training-officials-
idUSKCN1J41E7 (accessed 17 January 2020). 
32 Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (see note 30), 13. 
33 Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates (see note 4), 185. 
34 See, e.g., the statements made by Sheikh Khalifa Ibn 
Zayed in a 2007 interview, “We look forward to make the 
Arab Summit a turning point in joint Arab action”, Organi-
sation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies, 28 March 2007. 
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rak in early 2011. Although the Egyptian president 
had been a loyal ally of the US since taking office in 
1981, President Obama dropped him shortly after 
the protests began. On 1 February 2011, he even 
announced in front of White House cameras that 
Mubarak’s rule had to end, thus taking sides with the 
protesters.35 This was a severe shock for UAE rulers, 
forcing them to conclude that they could not count 
on Washington’s help in the event of an internal 
threat either. The UAE government also saw these 
events as an indication that the US intended to with-
draw gradually from the region, and decided to 
confront its opponents without the support of its 
powerful ally. A first example of the Abu Dhabi 
government’s new determination was Bahrain, which 
Emirati police and Saudi Arabian troops entered in 
March 2011 after very short notice to the US to sup-
port the Khalifa ruling family in crushing protests 
by the Shiite majority.36 
Disagreements with the Obama administration 
continued until the end of 2016. The leadership in 
Abu Dhabi officially welcomed the conclusion of the 
nuclear agreement with Iran in July 2015, merely 
noting that Tehran would continue its expansion 
policy in the Middle East regardless of the agreement, 
and expressing concern that the US might lose inter-
est in containment.37 Behind the scenes, however, the 
UAE vehemently rejected the US approach towards 
Iran, calling the Obama administration naive and 
accusing it of leaving the entire region to the Ira-
nians.38 The discontent of Mohammed Bin Zayed and 
his followers with Obama and his Middle East policy 
grew in 2015; in turn, the US president increasingly 
marked his distance from the monarchs in the Gulf. 
Obama’s goal was apparently to create a balance 
between Iran and its opponents in the Gulf. In an 
interview with the Atlantic in March 2016, he said 
the Saudis had to “share” the Middle East with their 
Iranian enemies: “The competition between the 
Saudis and the Iranians – which has helped to feed 
 
35 Helene Cooper and Robert F. Worth, “In Arab Spring, 
Obama Finds a Sharp Test”, The New York Times, 24 September 
2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/arab-
spring-proves-a-harsh-test-for-obamas-diplomatic-skill.html 
(accessed 17 January 2020). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (see note 30), 10f. 
38 Dexter Filkins: “A Saudi Prince’s Quest to Remake the 
Middle East”, The New Yorker, 9 April 2018, https://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/09/a-saudi-princes-quest-
to-remake-the-middle-east (accessed 17 January 2020). 
proxy wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen – 
requires us to say to our friends as well as to the Ira-
nians that they need to find an effective way to share 
the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold 
peace.”39 Although Obama did not specifically address 
the UAE, it was clear in Abu Dhabi that he did mean 
the Emirates among others. 
UAE leaders reacted with ever more open criticism 
of Obama and his policies. Although Mohammed 
Bin Zayed maintained close personal relations with 
Obama throughout his presidency, his ambassador 
in Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, was already quoted 
in 2014 as saying: “You’re still a superpower – but 
you no longer know how to act like one”.40 At that 
time Otaiba, a close confidant of Mohammed Bin 
Zayed, and ambassador to the USA since 2008, was 
one of the best-known diplomatic figures in Washing-
ton, meaning that his statements were widely noticed.41 
Republican politicians in particular shared the posi-
tions represented by Otaiba. 
In the course of 2016, the UAE representative in 
Washington also established contacts with the Trump 
campaign. The future president’s son-in-law, Jared 
Kushner, met with Otaiba on several occasions from 
spring 2016 onwards to discuss the Middle East. The 
New York Times later wrote that the Emirati had soon 
positioned himself as “an informal adviser on the 
region to Mr Kushner.”42 In December 2016, Moham-
 
39 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine. The U.S. Presi-
dent Talks through His Hardest Decisions about America’s 
Role in the World”, The Atlantic, April 2016, https://www. 
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-
doctrine/471525/#5 (accessed 17 January 2020). 
40 Quoted in David Rothkopf, “National Insecurity. Can 
Obama’s Foreign Policy Be Saved?” Foreign Policy, 9 Septem-
ber 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/09/national-
insecurity/. The article does not mention Otaiba by name. 
However, the description of the source alone makes it clear 
who is responsible for the statement, and Otaiba left no 
doubt about his authorship of the quote; see also Ryan Grim 
and Akbar Shahid Ahmed, “His Town”, Huffingtonpost, n.d., 
https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/his-town/ 
(both accessed 17 January 2020). 
41 On Otaiba, see “The UAE’s Young New Ambassador: 
MBZ’s Right Hand Man Gets Ready to Take on Washington” 
(cable 08ABUDHABI392_a), 27 March 2008, WikiLeaks, https:// 
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ABUDHABI392_a.html (accessed 
17 January 2020). 
42 David D. Kirkpatrick, Ben Hubbard, Mark Landler and 
Mark Mazzetti, “The Wooing of Jared Kushner: How the 
Saudis Got a Friend in the White House”, The New York Times, 
8 December 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/08/ 
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med Bin Zayed himself travelled to New York to meet 
with the newly elected Trump and his advisors. Ac-
cording to press reports, the interlocutors were quick 
to discuss their shared anti-Iranian stance, and the 
meeting developed into a lively exchange on future 
policy towards Tehran.43 These first personal contacts 
developed over the next few months into an increas-
ingly close cooperation between Washington and 
Abu Dhabi. 
The Trump administration pursued a 
goal of forging an anti-Iranian 
alliance that would include the UAE 
as a key partner. 
The trust underpinning the cooperation between 
the Trump administration and the UAE government 
was shown by the conclusion of a new security agree-
ment, confirmed by Defence Secretary James Mattis 
and Mohammed Bin Zayed in May 2017. In contrast 
to the 1994 agreement, the contents were public and 
mainly concerned the stationing of US military in the 
UAE, measures to train the Emirati armed forces, and 
joint manoeuvres. The US presence in the Emirates 
is now greater than ever. It currently has some 5,000 
troops stationed at the Al Dhafra air base, the port 
of Jebel Ali and smaller naval bases in Fujaira on the 
Gulf of Oman. Some 3,500 men are at Al Dhafra 
alone, where the US Air Force has deployed combat 
and surveillance drones and reconnaissance aircraft 
as well as F-15s, F-22s and (since April 2019) F-35s.44 
In parallel, the Emirates have also been working on 
their own military capabilities and have purchased 
weapon systems from the US on a large scale. Their 
air force and missile defence are at the centre of the 
procurement activities. Since 2000 alone, the UAE 
has purchased 110 F-16s.45 In spring 2017, it also an-
nounced an interest in purchasing the F-35 fighter, 
but negotiations with the USA do not appear to have 
been concluded yet.46 The Patriot missile defence 
 
world/middleeast/saudi-mbs-jared-kushner.html (accessed 
20 January 2020). 
43 Jodi Kantor, “For Kushner, Israel Policy May Be Shaped 
by the Personal”, The New York Times, 11 February 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/us/politics/jared-
kushner-israel.html (accessed 20 January 2020). 
44 Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (see note 30), 18–19. 
45 Ibid., 20. 
46 Carmelo Cruz, “UAE to Trump: Sell Us Some F-35 
Fighter Jets”, International Policy Digest, 11 July 2018, https:// 
system and the more modern THAAD system were 
deployed in the UAE after 2009 and from 2016, re-
spectively.47 Since 2018 there have been problems 
with the procurement of precision-guided munitions 
from the USA. The reason has been resistance in 
Congress, which has opposed arms supplies to Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE because the two allies used 
American materiel in the Yemen war. The murder 
of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in late 2018 
further reduced approval of supplies to the two coun-
tries, forcing the US president to use his veto to make 
them possible.48 
Despite these difficulties, the Trump administra-
tion made efforts to support the UAE in its regional 
policy. Its primary goal was to forge an anti-Iranian 
alliance of Middle Eastern states, which would in-
clude the UAE as a key partner alongside Saudi Ara-
bia and Egypt. This plan was in line with the agenda 
of the leadership in Abu Dhabi, which is likely to 
have had a major influence on its development, ac-
cording to press reports about the proximity between 
the Ambassador of the Emirates Otaiba and Trump’s 
Middle East advisor Kushner. The UAE is also impor-
tant to the current US administration because it has 
the least problems with Jared Kushner’s plans for 
peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Bin Zayed 
would probably also accept a solution that is largely 
in line with the Israeli government’s ideas. 
 
intpolicydigest.org/2018/07/11/uae-to-trump-sell-us-some-f-35-
fighter-jets/ (accessed 20 January 2020). 
47 “UAE Seals Deal for Patriot Missiles”, The National, 25 
December 2008, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-seals-
deal-for-patriot-missiles-1.516237; Missile Defense Project, 
“Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)”, Missile 
Threat (Center for Strategic and International Studies), 15 
June 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/ (both 
accessed 20 January 2020). 
48 Catie Edmondson, “House Votes to Block Arms Sales to 
Gulf Nations, Setting up Trump’s Third Veto”, The New York 
Times, 17 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/ 
us/politics/saudi-arms-vote.html (accessed 20 January 2020). 
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The UAE and Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is the UAE’s most important ally aside 
from the USA. Both states have been US allies for 
decades. Their political systems are monarchical, they 
are funded by oil exports, and they fear the expan-
sionist urges of powerful neighbours, above all Iran. 
For a long time, however, the Emirates’ leadership 
was concerned that Saudi Arabia could use its un-
equal size (the kingdom has more than 30 million 
inhabitants, higher oil reserves and larger armed 
forces) to rise to a position of hegemony in the Gulf. 
As a result, between 1971 and the 1990s, the UAE 
acted as a junior partner to Saudi Arabia, seeking 
proximity to its more powerful neighbour, but always 
remaining suspicious. 
The loss of the three islands in 1971, the year it 
was founded, had shown the young state its vulner-
ability. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 
put the leadership in Abu Dhabi under even greater 
pressure. The Gulf States took the opportunity to 
form an alliance excluding the regional great powers. 
In May 1981 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE founded the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). Its military instrument was supposed 
to be a joint unit called the Peninsula Shield Force, 
but it never developed into a significant military 
force. Just how weak the Gulf States were despite 
their alliance was shown by the Kuwait War, during 
which Iraq occupied GCC member state Kuwait with-
out the Council offering any resistance. As a result, 
the UAE henceforth relied entirely on protection by 
the USA, which alone was able and willing to defend 
the small rich state against potentially aggressive 
neighbours. 
With the UAE’s increasing military 
strength and growing financial 
power, Abu Dhabi gained political 
weight in relation to Riyadh. 
Nevertheless, relations between Riyadh and Abu 
Dhabi became even closer when both rejected the 
2003 Iraq war because they believed it threatened to 
destabilise the region and increase Iran’s power. The 
UAE therefore supported Saudi Arabia when it began 
to actively oppose Iran’s expansion in the Middle East 
from 2005 onwards.49 Saudi Arabia has been the main 
 
49 For a detailed discussion of this policy, see Guido Stein-
berg, Saudi-Arabien als Partner deutscher Nahostpolitik, SWP-
focus of public reporting on this rivalry, but as the 
UAE’s military strength and financial power grew, 
so did Abu Dhabi’s political weight. The young and 
dynamic leadership around Mohammed Bin Zayed 
was increasingly impatient with the often risk averse 
and hesitant old princes in Riyadh. 
It was not until 2011 that Saudi Arabian politicians 
reacted more quickly and decisively. This was mainly 
due to the urgency of the problems the Kingdom 
faced as a result of the Arab Spring. From 2011, the 
Saudi and Emirati leaders pursued two common 
goals. First, they sought to minimise the impact of 
region-wide protests on the Gulf States and their allies 
in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. From their perspective 
it became increasingly clear from 2012 onwards that 
the Muslim Brotherhood benefited most from the 
events, and that its seizure of power had to be pre-
vented or – as in Egypt – revised. Second, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE intended to stop Iran’s expansion 
in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen and, if possible, to 
reverse it. Like Abu Dhabi, Riyadh placed little hope 
in the Obama administration for these efforts; both 
states therefore took action themselves.50 There was 
only a difference in their priorities: for the UAE, the 
fight against the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islam-
ists was unmistakeably more important than for Saudi 
Arabia, which concentrated on the conflict with Iran. 
From 2011 to 2019, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE mostly pursued regional 
policies together, relying increasingly 
on military means. 
The result of this congruence of interests was that, 
from 2011 to 2019, Saudi Arabia and the UAE mostly 
pursued regional policy together and increasingly 
relied on military means. This was the case in Bahrain 
in 2011, after the ruler of the island kingdom, Hamad 
Bin Isa al-Khalifa, asked the Gulf Cooperation Council 
for help against the Shiite protest movement threaten-
ing his rule. But its most important intervention was 
supporting the military coup in Egypt against Presi-
dent Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood 
in July 2013. 
 
Studie 35/2008 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
December 2008), 17–19, https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2008_S35_sbg_ks.pdf 
(accessed 20 January 2020). 
50 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Fire and Fury in the Gulf”, 
IndraStra Global 4, no. 2 (2018): 1–8 (2). 
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After King Salman’s accession to the throne in 
January 2015, the rapprochement between Riyadh 
and Abu Dhabi continued. The new Saudi ruler 
immediately made his son Mohammed Bin Salman 
the focus of public attention, appointing him 
minister of defence that month, and in April 2015 
declaring him number two in the succession to the 
throne.51 He thus cleared the way for increased cen-
tralisation and a correspondingly more decisive 
policy. The relationship between Mohammed Bin 
Zayed and the then largely unknown Mohammed Bin 
Salman was excellent. The two seem to have known 
each other for a long time, because soon after Bin 
Salman’s appointment, Bin Zayed was described as 
his “mentor”, having a great influence on the then 
only 29-year-old Saudi.52 According to press reports, 
the Emirati leadership and its ambassador Yousef Al 
Otaiba lobbied hard for the young Saudi in Washing-
ton.53 It is unclear whether and to what extent these 
activities influenced the course of events in Riyadh, 
but shortly after the enthronement of his father, 
Mohammed Bin Salman proved to be the new strong 
man in Riyadh. As defence minister, he started the 
war in Yemen in March 2015, together with the UAE 
leadership. In “Vision 2030”, presented in June 2016, 
he developed an ambitious reform programme for the 
Saudi Arabian economy, which is primarily intended 
to end his country’s dependence on oil. Social changes, 
such as the licensing of cinemas and the extension 
of the right to drive a car to women, completed the 
picture of the energetic moderniser.54 
The social and economic reforms initiated by 
Mohammed Bin Salman were accompanied by the 
ruthless elimination of his competitors. In June 2017, 
 
51 Hugh Naylor and Liz Sly, “In a Surprise Move, Saudi 
Arabia’s Monarch Shakes up Line of Succession”, The 
Washington Post, 29 April 2015, https://wapo.st/2urQGOT 
(accessed 20 January 2020). 
52 David Ignatius, “A 30-year-old Saudi Prince Could Jump-
start the Kingdom – or Drive It off a Cliff”, The Washington 
Post, 28 June 2016, https://wapo.st/39p0h7F (accessed 20 Janu-
ary 2020). 
53 David D. Kirkpatrick, “The Most Powerful Arab Ruler 
Isn’t M.B.S. It’s M.B.Z.”, The New York Times, 2 June 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/world/middleeast/ 
crown-prince-mohammed-bin-zayed.html (accessed 20 Janu-
ary 2020). 
54 Pankaj Mishra, “The Enduring Fantasy of the Modern-
izing Autocrat”, The New York Times, 25 October 2018, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/opinion/autocrats-prince-
mohammed-saudi-arabia.html (accessed 20 January 2020). 
he forced his cousin Mohammed Bin Nayif to re-
nounce the title of crown prince and the office of 
interior minister. Bin Salman became crown prince 
himself and continued his path to power in Novem-
ber 2017, when he had his last potential rival, Mit’ab 
Bin Abdullah, the son of the late King Abdullah 
and commander of the powerful National Guard, de-
tained. Since then, Mohammed Bin Salman has been 
in control of all the armed forces in Saudi Arabia and 
is in charge of all day-to-day political affairs, indicat-
ing that he will become king after his father’s death. 
It is therefore unlikely to have been a coincidence 
that Saudi Arabia and the UAE intensified their co-
operation in late 2017. A particularly visible expres-
sion of this trend was the establishment in December 
2017 of a committee for the enhancement of security 
co-operation outside the GCC – which had been set 
up for this very purpose in 1981.55 
The UAE served Bin Salman as a model for his 
domestic political reforms. This was evident not only 
in the centralisation of political power in one person, 
which was very similar to developments in Abu Dhabi 
and the Emirates; the Emirati influence can also be 
seen in the overall reform programme that he launched 
in Saudi Arabia in 2015. His economic reforms were 
aimed, among other things, at building a strong sov-
ereign wealth fund (SWF), which is also the focus of 
economic policy in the UAE, the country with the 
largest SWF in the world. Crown Prince Mohammed 
Bin Salman wanted social changes that would return 
Saudi Arabia to the period before 1979, when the king-
dom was more liberal than in the following decades.56 
At the same time, Saudi Arabia under Mohammed 
Bin Salman acts much more uninhibitedly authoritar-
ian than before. Here, too, the rulers in Riyadh follow 
the example of Mohammed Bin Zayed’s UAE, in ruth-
lessly suppressing the Islamist and liberal opposition 
in the country. 
 
55 Patrick Wintour, “UAE Announces New Saudi Alliance 
That Could Reshape Gulf Relations”, The Guardian, 5 Decem-
ber 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/05/ 
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ary 2020). 
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The new regional policy that the UAE has been pur-
suing since 2011 has two key elements. First, the 
Emirates, together with Saudi Arabia yet in its shad-
ow, have established themselves as leaders of the 
counterrevolution. They were concerned that the 
protests and unrest of the Arab Spring would spread 
further, and supported those political and military 
forces that promised to limit the consequences of the 
upheavals and at the same time were pro-Western. In 
practice, this meant above all that Abu Dhabi took 
stronger action against Muslim Brotherhood Islamists, 
who could be considered the big winners of the up-
heavals as of 2012. Egypt and Libya became the most 
important projects for this Emirati policy. 
Second, the leadership in Abu Dhabi turned 
against Iranian expansion, which was being fuelled 
by growing instability in the Middle East and which 
it perceived as a threat. In Syria, the UAE participated 
in supporting the insurgents only as a junior partner 
of the Saudis – and failed along with its allies when 
Russia intervened to back the Assad regime in the 
summer of 2015.57 From March 2015 until spring 
2019, the Emirates instead focused on the war in 
Yemen, where they tried to crush the Iranian-backed 
Houthi rebels alongside Saudi Arabia. 
The two core elements of the Emirates’ regional 
policy – the fight against Islamists and the contain-
ment of Iran – are linked in the conflict between 
the UAE and Qatar. Qatar became the most important 
promoter of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab 
world from 2011 and maintained close relations 
with Iran. Since 2014, the UAE, together with Saudi 
Arabia, has been trying to force the neighbouring 
emirate to change its policy. This was the reason for 
the Emirati (and Saudi) decision to impose a land, sea 
and air blockade on Qatar, a policy that bears witness 
to the Emirates’ claim to hegemony on the Arabian 
Peninsula in conjunction with Saudi Arabia. 
 
57 The UAE’s role in Syria was so marginal that this study 
does not devote a chapter to aid for the insurgency. 
Leading the Counterrevolution 
Egypt 
The unexpected fall of Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak on 11 February 2011 was a severe shock 
for the UAE leadership. The Gulf States had always 
considered the dictator an important ally who, like 
them, was pro-Western in foreign policy and authori-
tarian in domestic policy. To maintain continuity 
as much as possible, the UAE and Saudi Arabia sub-
sequently supported the Egyptian military leadership, 
which had remained unaffected by the political tur-
moil and tried to keep the transition from the Muba-
rak system to new structures under control via the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (al-Majlis al-
A’la li-l-Quwwat al-Musallaha). The UAE promised 
Egypt $3.3 billion in aid in spring 2011, although it is 
unclear how much was actually paid.58 Saudi Arabia 
also promised support at this stage, but Cairo’s rela-
tions with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi deteriorated when 
the Muslim Brotherhood won the 2011–2012 par-
liamentary elections held in three rounds, and its 
candidate Mohammed Morsi subsequently won the 
June 2012 presidential elections. It is likely that the 
UAE had provided support to the defeated candidate, 
Ahmed Shafiq, a representative of the ancien régime. 
One indication is that Shafiq moved his residence to 
the Emirates shortly after the election.59 
Morsi’s election victory was also a defeat for the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia. In Abu Dhabi, the rise of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was seen as a threat, 
since Mohammed Bin Zayed feared its influence on 
its Emirati branch, al-Islah, which he had repeatedly 
called the most dangerous opposition force in the 
UAE. It was therefore no coincidence that the Emirati 
 
58 Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates (see note 4), 200. 
59 Na’eem Jenaah, “The Egyptian Crisis: Two Coups Later, 
the Military Is Still in Control”, in Promoting Progressive African 
Thought Leadership, ed. Aziz Pahad, Garth le Pere and Miranda 
Strydom (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015), 
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leadership began to take more vigorous action against 
the local Muslim Brothers exactly in 2012, subsequently 
crushing them as completely as any ideological move-
ment can be crushed. Egyptian migrant workers were 
also convicted of belonging to the Muslim Brother-
hood.60 Alarm in the UAE was heightened when Qatar 
took advantage of the poor relations between Abu 
Dhabi and Cairo to come to the aid of the new Egyp-
tian government. In 2012 and 2013, the small emirate 
became Egypt’s main foreign donor.61 
After 2013, the UAE became by far the 
most important foreign supporter of 
the al-Sisi regime. 
After the election of the Muslim Brother Morsi, the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia began planning a coup d’état 
with the Egyptian military. They not only contacted 
the then Minister of Defence Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi 
and provided the putschists with money, but also 
financed the protest movement against Morsi and the 
Muslim Brotherhood which had developed around an 
alliance of youth activists called Tamarrud (“revolt”). 
Their mass demonstrations provided the pretext 
for the coup.62 On 3 July 2013, the military led by 
General al-Sisi overthrew the government and took 
power. Islamist protests were brutally crushed: more 
than a thousand demonstrators died. Tens of thou-
sands ended up in prison, including Morsi and all the 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders that the new rulers were 
able to arrest. The movement was banned in Septem-
 
60 Courtney Freer, “The Muslim Brotherhood in the 
Emirates: Anatomy of a Crackdown”, Middle East Eye, 17 
December 2015, https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/ 
muslim-brotherhood-emirates-anatomy-crackdown (accessed 
20 January 2020). 
61 Imad K. Harb, “An Economic Explanation for Egypt’s 
Alignment in the GCC Crisis” (Washington, D.C.: Arab Center 
Washington DC, 9 August 2017), http://arabcenterdc.org/ 
policy_analyses/an-economic-explanation-for-egypts-
alignment-in-the-gcc-crisis/ (accessed 20 January 2020). 
62 Audio recordings of conversations between leading mili-
tary figures, leaked in February 2015, support this thesis. 
See David D. Kirkpatrick, “Recordings Suggest Emirates and 
Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi”, The New York 
Times, 1 March 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/ 
world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-
military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html (accessed 20 January 
2020); see also Filkins: “A Saudi Prince’s Quest” (see note 38). 
ber 2013 and declared a terrorist organisation in 
December of the same year.63 
The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reacted quickly 
by pledging $12 billion in aid to Egypt the week after 
the coup, and then paid it quickly as well.64 In the 
years that followed, the UAE became by far the most 
important foreign supporter of the al-Sisi regime. 
They invested in the Egyptian economy and helped 
fight Islamist terrorists in the Sinai. Abu Dhabi paid 
more than $20 billion between 2013 and 2019, pro-
viding the lion’s share of the financial aid that flowed 
into Egypt from the Gulf.65 Over time, however, Abu 
Dhabi reduced its direct contributions. One reason 
could have been the end of the high-price phase for 
oil, which lasted from 2002 to summer 2014.66 How-
ever, growing doubts about whether Cairo would ever 
tackle the urgently needed economic reforms that 
were repeatedly called for by the UAE may have been 
more central to the decision.67 
From 2015 onwards, the Emirates focused their 
economic strategy in Egypt on direct investments. 
Shortly after the coup d’état in 2013, they had already 
set up an Egypt Task Force with offices in Cairo and 
Abu Dhabi, which was headed by Minister of State 
Sultan Ahmed al-Jaber and was to steer Emirati activ-
ities in Egypt.68 The most important investments an-
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of $8 bn”, Financial Times, 10 July 2013, https://www.ft.com/ 
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20 January 2020). 
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Politik, January 2016), 7, https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
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nounced in 2014 and 2015 concerned the construc-
tion sector. However, a gigantic housing construction 
project was soon scaled down considerably and the 
Emirates’ involvement in the construction of the new 
capital was abandoned for economic reasons. There 
were nevertheless numerous smaller joint projects. 
Security cooperation between the UAE and Egypt 
was more successful – security apparently being the 
top cooperation priority for the Gulf State. With over 
100 million inhabitants, Egypt is the most populous 
Arab country, and its 440,000 troops are at least 
theoretically in a position to compensate for the lack 
of personnel in the Emirati armed forces.69 The fact 
that the UAE was primarily interested in military 
cooperation was demonstrated by talks in 2014, in 
which Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were involved as well 
as the Emirates and Egypt. The talks focused on the 
formation of a military pact between the four states 
and the establishment of a joint rapid reaction force. 
Although the negotiations took place with the Obama 
administration’s knowledge, they also reflected a 
growing distrust of Washington. According to the 
Gulf States and Egypt, the fight of the international 
alliance against IS in Iraq and Syria was too focused 
on a single terrorist group. Their own alliance was 
supposed to complement the anti-IS coalition and 
target a broader spectrum of Islamist groups.70 The 
list of terrorist groups presented by the UAE, which 
was published at the same time as the press reports 
on the talks, made it clear which organisations were 
involved: in addition to the IS and al-Qaida, it lists 
the Muslim Brotherhood and numerous groups 
belonging to it. The Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias 
in Iraq, and militant Shiite groups in the Gulf region 
are also mentioned.71 
Parallel to these talks, the UAE supported the Cairo 
leadership in the fight against IS, which had begun to 
operate in Egypt in 2014. Mohammed Bin Zayed sent 
 
pulse/fr/originals/2014/07/egypt-uae-sisi-gulf-aid-muslim-
brotherhood.html (accessed 20 January 2020). 
69 On troop numbers, see International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies (IISS), “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North 
Africa”, The Military Balance 2018, 329. Egypt has 397,000 
paramilitaries in addition to its army. 
70 Hamza Hendawi, “Egypt, Gulf Arab Allies Eye Anti-
militant Alliance”, Associated Press, 4 November 2014. 
71 “List of Groups Designated Terrorist Organisations by 
the UAE”, The National, 16 November 2014, https://www. 
thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-
terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae-1.270037 (accessed 20 
January 2020). 
Emirati special forces to train and support Egyptian 
troops. According to press reports, the UAE military 
is also said to have participated directly in operations 
against the terrorists.72 In Libya, too, the Egyptian and 
Emirati military worked closely together from 2014. 
Together they supported General Haftar in his fight 
for control of the country. However, the limits of 
their cooperation became apparent in Yemen when, 
in spring 2015, the Egyptian leadership refused to 
comply with a Saudi Arabian request to send troops 
to fight the Houthi rebels. As a result, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE stood alone alongside their Yemeni 
allies. 
However, the project of a military alliance includ-
ing Egypt continued. The joint committee of the Gulf 
states, founded outside the GCC at the end of 2017, 
was a step in this direction. By spring 2017, the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia had already succeeded in persuad-
ing the Trump administration to join forces on a 
larger scale. The USA was primarily interested in forg-
ing a regional alliance of pro-Western states against 
Iran. Egypt was to be an important pillar of the 
project, which was named the Middle East Strategic 
Alliance (MESA). A formal pact was not concluded, 
but until spring 2019 the informal alliance included 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, 
in addition to Egypt. These states’ armed forces even 
undertook joint manoeuvres in Egypt in November 
2018.73 But in April 2019 Cairo withdrew from the 
project, which was informally dubbed “the Arab 
NATO”. The al-Sisi government is said to have feared, 
inter alia, that the tensions with Tehran could lead 
to a direct confrontation.74 Indeed, it remains rather 
sceptical about the US’s anti-Iran policy, because con-
taining Iran is not nearly as important to Egypt as it 
is for its partners. The withdrawal also showed that 
Cairo, despite generous support, is not prepared to 
follow UAE/Saudi Arabian leadership. Although the 
UAE had a strong ally in Egypt, the latter repeatedly 
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demonstrated that it considers itself to be the much 
more important regional power. Only as long as their 
interests coincided completely did the Egyptians co-
operate closely with the Emiratis. This is especially 
true with regard to Libya. 
Libya 
At the start of the UAE intervention in Libya in 2011, 
its anti-Islamist thrust was only vaguely discernible. 
Among the motives for intervening in the civil-war-
torn North African country, the most prevalent may 
initially have been the desire to prove itself a valuable 
ally vis-à-vis the US and NATO. From 2012 and espe-
cially 2014, however, the UAE’s goal became increas-
ingly clear: Abu Dhabi wanted to prevent Islamists 
from taking power in Tripoli and favoured an 
authoritarian autocracy instead. The UAE found its 
partner in General Khalifa Haftar, who from 2014 
onwards tried to extend his control from Eastern 
Libya to the entire country. 
The (first) Libyan civil war broke out in February 
2011, after security forces of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s 
regime unsuccessfully attempted to break up a series 
of protest rallies with armed force. On 17 March 2011, 
as Gaddafi’s troops marched towards the rebel strong-
hold of Benghazi, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1973, allowing an intervention to protect 
the civilian population. In the preceding days, the 
UAE and Qatar had been instrumental in organising 
the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League 
to demand the establishment of a no-fly zone for the 
Libyan military. The diplomatic activities of the two 
Gulf States made it easier for the USA and its allies to 
counter the impression that the subsequent interven-
tion was a war waged by the West against an Arab 
country.75 
The UAE and Qatar also took part in the subse-
quent fighting against Gaddafi’s troops. The UAE sent 
twelve fighter planes; Qatar sent six. Both states also 
supported certain insurgents with money and weap-
ons. The UAE quickly found its preferred ally in the 
Zintan militias. The city southwest of Tripoli, with a 
population of about 50–60,000, quickly gained in 
importance because units commanded by its military 
 
75 Jean-Marc Rickli, “The Political Rationale and Impli-
cations of the United Arab Emirates’ Military Involvement 
in Libya”, in Political Rationale and International Consequences of 
the War in Libya, ed. Dag Henriksen and Ann Karin Larssen 
(Oxford, 2016), 134–54 (142). 
council became the second strongest militia alliance 
in the country with this Emirati support. The Zintan 
Brigades belong to the nationalist spectrum of Libyan 
politics, and had opposed the powerful Islamist groups 
from an early stage.76 The Islamists’ mightiest force 
was the militia alliance of Misrata, a port city east of 
Tripoli, which received support from Qatar from 2011 
onwards.77 In the years that followed, the conflict 
between the armed groups increasingly took on the 
character of a proxy war of the UAE against Qatar. 
The militias from Zintan were not very powerful 
in numbers, with just several thousand fighters. But 
they benefited from the experience of former officers 
of the Gaddafi regime, who, together with Emirati 
trainers, ensured that the Zintan militias became 
known for their good organisation and their fighting 
strength, which was high by Libyan standards. The 
competition with the Islamist organisations became 
more apparent from August 2011 onwards, when an 
alliance of revolutionary groups with different ideo-
logical orientations took over the capital Tripoli and 
did not desist from violence within the metropolis 
even after the end of the civil war in October 2011. 
Thereafter the Zintan militias controlled, among 
other things, the international airport south of 
Tripoli.78 The weak transitional governments of the 
years 2011–2014 failed to bring the victorious mili-
tias under their control, with the result that conflicts 
between nationalists and Islamists over who ruled in 
the capital city intensified. In the summer of 2014, 
these clashes led to a second civil war, when fighting 
broke out in Tripoli between enemy militias, from 
which an alliance led by armed groups from Misrata, 
called Dawn of Libya (Fajr Libiya), emerged victorious. 
In August, Dawn militias took the capital’s inter-
national airport, driving out the UAE proxy troops.79 
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The year 2014 was a turning point in Libya and in 
the UAE’s policy towards the country. Abu Dhabi 
was now looking for a new partner. One important 
motivation was the rise of Islamist militias, which 
were gaining ground not only in the capital Tripoli. 
In the east of the country, too, Islamist groups of 
various orientations had been growing stronger and 
stronger since 2012. They were able to expand their 
influence in Benghazi and brought large parts of the 
city under their control. In July 2014, there were 
the first public indications of an IS presence in the 
Eastern Libyan Jihadist stronghold of Derna.80 An 
important trigger for the UAE’s now more active 
policy was an incident in the same month, in which 
21 Egyptian border guards were killed near the 
Libyan border during an attack by an armed group. 
Egypt blamed “terrorists” for the attack, and Cairo 
began debating military intervention in the neigh-
bouring country. The UAE leadership also feared that 
the civil war in Libya might affect Egypt’s stability. As 
early as August, Emirati fighter planes flew two waves 
of attacks against Misrata militias in Tripoli from a 
base in Egypt, but were unable to prevent the Dawn 
coalition from taking over the capital.81 
As of 2014, the UAE became Haftar’s 
most important aide in terms of 
money and arms supplies. 
At this point in the summer of 2014, if not earlier, 
the UAE decided to support the Libyan warlord 
Khalifa Haftar. Haftar is a former army officer and 
associate of Gaddafi’s, who broke with the dictator in 
the late 1980s. He had already tried to gain a political-
military foothold in Libya in 2011. In February 2014 
Haftar reappeared and began to build a military force. 
He merged Eastern Libyan tribal groups and former 
units of the Gaddafi regime into the Libyan National 
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Army (LNA). Haftar rallied his troops under the ban-
ner of an uncompromising fight against Islamists 
and terrorists, and promoted himself as Libya’s new 
strong man. In May 2014 he launched an offensive 
under the name Operation Dignity (Karama). The start 
of this campaign prompted Haftar’s opponents to 
found the aforementioned Dawn coalition, which 
claimed to defend the Libyan revolution against a 
counter-revolution by the old regime (namely Haftar) 
based on the Egyptian model, and was supported by 
Qatar and Turkey. Haftar was unable to penetrate the 
west of the country with the LNA and prevent the 
Dawn militias from taking over the capital. Instead, 
from 2015, he concentrated on conquering Benghazi 
and creating a power base in the Cyrenaica region. 
The commander received support from Egypt, the UAE 
and – less openly – Saudi Arabia from summer 
2014, if not before.82 
From 2014, the UAE became Haftar’s most signifi-
cant supporter, whose troops replaced the Zintan 
militias as the most important recipients of financial 
and arms supplies from the Emirates. In June 2016, 
they established an air base in Haftar-controlled terri-
tory in the east of the country and supported the 
LNA’s advance from the air.83 Emirati special forces 
are also said to have intervened in the fighting on 
Haftar’s side.84 However, they mainly equipped the 
warlord with weapons, including modern ones such 
as attack helicopters, armoured vehicles, combat drones 
and anti-aircraft missiles – an approach that is ques-
tionable under international law, since a UN arms 
embargo has been in force for Libya since February 
2011 (which the UAE has ignored from the outset). 
On the ground, General Haftar had great difficulty 
in achieving his military objectives. It soon became 
apparent that his Libyan National Army was more of 
a militia alliance with limited clout. It therefore took 
until February 2016 for Haftar’s units to report their 
first successes against the powerful Islamists in Ben-
ghazi. They did not finally defeat their opponents 
in the city until November 2017, owing in part to 
Emirati air support. Another reason why Haftar’s 
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fighters were finally able to prevail was that Jihadists 
loyal to IS had withdrawn from Benghazi and other 
places in the east to the city of Sirte, further west, in 
2015. There they took control from the summer of 
2015 and established state-like structures based on 
the Iraqi and Syrian model. It was not Haftar’s troops, 
however, but militias from Misrata that drove the 
jihadists out of Sirte in December 2016 with US sup-
port.85 
Despite these difficulties, the UAE appears to have 
increased its arms supplies to Haftar since 2017. A 
factor was probably that the Trump administration 
was less critical of Abu Dhabi’s actions in Libya than 
its predecessor. The Obama administration saw 
Haftar, and Emirati and Egyptian support for him, 
as an obstacle to a political solution to the conflict 
in Libya. On several occasions, it also criticised Abu 
Dhabi’s routine circumvention of the UN arms em-
bargo, sometimes in harsh terms.86 In contrast, the 
Trump government showed no interest in the North 
African country. Officially, however, it supported (like 
its predecessor) the unity government under Prime 
Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, which was recognised by 
the UN in March 2016. It was therefore all the more 
surprising that in April 2019 President Trump broke 
with existing US policy towards Libya and had a state-
ment published announcing that the White House 
backed Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli, which had just 
begun. According to press reports, Trump was per-
suaded to take this step by Mohammed Bin Zayed in 
a telephone conversation.87 
Khalifa Haftar had already used US indifference, 
and the increased aid from Egypt and the UAE from 
2017 onwards, to take the cities of Sabha and Ubari 
in southern and south-western Libya in January and 
February 2019.88 After this, the advance on Tripoli, 
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which began in April 2019, was only logical. Haftar 
seems to have gambled on the disunity of the militias 
in the capital, but they overcame their rivalries to 
fend off the attack. They even succeeded in going on 
the counter-offensive and pushing back the “National 
Army”, resulting in a temporary military stalemate. It 
was not until autumn 2019 that Haftar’s troops made 
progress again, after Russia had extended its support 
and sent mercenaries. After Turkey intervened on the 
side of the unity government in early 2020, Haftar’s 
forces were pushed back, resulting in an uneasy stale-
mate yet again. 
Containing Iran in Yemen 
The second important goal of the new Emirati regional 
policy was to halt Iranian expansion, which had 
accelerated from 2011 onwards against the backdrop 
of increasing instability in the region. Its significance 
was first demonstrated by the UAE during the protests 
in Bahrain in March 2011, when it intervened in 
favour of the Sunni ruling family against the Shiite 
insurgency. Yet in Syria the Emirates supported rebel 
groups against the Assad regime because it is allied 
with Iran. By far the most important arena of the con-
flict with Iran, however, was Yemen, where Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE jointly intervened from March 
2015 against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. Never-
theless, for the Emirates the goal of pushing Iran back 
was always secondary to fighting (Sunni) Islamists in 
the Arab world. The Yemen war thus repeatedly high-
lighted differences of opinion between Riyadh and 
Abu Dhabi, and the UAE finally left the alliance in 
July 2019, and withdrew its contingent. 
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi feared that 
the Houthi rebels would establish 
a “Yemeni Hezbollah”. 
The rise of the Houthi rebels was the reason for 
the Emirati and Saudi military intervention in Yemen. 
In September 2014, Shiite militiamen had seized the 
Yemeni capital Sanaa and driven out the government 
of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Subsequently, 
the insurgents even advanced far into the south of 
the country and, in March, conquered the port city of 
Aden. One reason for their astonishing successes was 
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that before the march on Aden, they had allied them-
selves with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and 
the army units that were still controlled by him. The 
initial aim of the Saudi-Emirati coalition was to help 
Hadi regain power throughout the country and smash 
the Houthi-Saleh alliance. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi 
feared that the rebels would set up a “Yemeni Hez-
bollah”, which, like the Lebanese organisation of that 
name, would threaten neighbouring countries. Since 
Tehran supplied money and weapons, and since Ira-
nian Revolutionary Guards and Lebanese Hezbollah 
trained the Houthi fighters, the coalition partners ac-
cused the Houthis of taking their orders from Iran.89 
At the time, this perception only partially corre-
sponded to the reality, since the ties between the 
rebel group and Iran were significantly weaker in 
2014 than in later years. Politically, ideologically and 
militarily, the Houthi militia was never as strongly 
oriented towards Tehran as Lebanese Hezbollah, nor 
did it at any time receive as much support as Shiite 
groups in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, the 
Iranians became successively more active after 2014, 
amid growing indications that the Houthis used 
Iranian materiel in their attacks on Saudi Arabian 
territory.90 This support was already evident in 2017, 
when the rebels used ballistic missiles with a greater 
range than before, and even more so from 2018, 
when the Saudi Arabian military increasingly inter-
cepted ballistic missiles which the Houthis had fired 
at Saudi Arabia. As a result, the Iranians began to 
equip their allies with combat drones and cruise 
missiles as well, which are much harder to intercept. 
To date, it has not been conclusively elucidated 
who took the initiative for the war in Yemen in 2015. 
According to some reports, it was the crown prince 
of Abu Dhabi who convinced the Saudi leadership. If 
so, the change of king in January proved a favourable 
circumstance for the Emirates, since the new Defence 
Minister Mohammed Bin Salman was a strong sup-
porter of military intervention. Moreover, Abu Dhabi 
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and Riyadh benefited from US support. Although the 
Obama administration was critical of the Emirati and 
Saudi actions, it decided to help. This was a reaction 
to the two Arab partners’ growing dissatisfaction with 
US regional policy and especially with the nuclear 
agreement with Iran, which was almost ready to be 
signed at that time. Obama believed that he needed 
to accommodate his allies by supporting them in their 
fight against Iran’s expansion in the region. The US 
military thus transmitted target data and other intel-
ligence information, helped select targets, refuelled 
Saudi Arabian aircraft in the air, and supplied ammu-
nition and spare parts.91 Without this support, the 
Saudi Air Force would not have been able to conduct 
the war in Yemen for more than five years; the UAE 
military was also heavily dependent on American sup-
port. However, even in the first years of the war, criti-
cism in Congress, which was provoked by the large 
numbers of civilian casualties during the air attacks 
and by the lengthy fighting, became increasingly 
vocal. In December 2016, the Obama administration 
reacted by stopping the sale of guided munitions kits 
to the Saudi military.92 However, under Obama there 
was no change to the principle of support. 
The US government’s restrictive measures mainly 
affected the Saudis, because of the division of labour 
that had developed between the Saudi and Emirati 
forces during the first months of the war. The Saudis 
concentrated on the north and fought the Houthis 
primarily from the air; the UAE troops, on the other 
hand, concentrated on South Yemen, where they took 
the port city of Aden in July 2015.93 However, from 
the first few months onwards, the coalition’s biggest 
problem proved to be the lack of ground troops. Riyadh 
and Abu Dhabi seem to have hoped to persuade Egypt 
or Pakistan to send suitable units, but Cairo only par-
ticipated in the sea blockade, while Pakistan showed 
no interest at all. Saudi Arabia and the UAE then tried 
to recruit mercenaries. In fact, Sudan and Senegal pro-
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vided regular troops and militiamen for a fee.94 The 
UAE also sent its own mercenary force, mostly Latin 
American, which Abu Dhabi had been putting to-
gether for years.95 To further increase the number of 
available soldiers, the UAE began training Yemeni 
units. In the course of the conflict, they formed an 
alliance in the south, led by Emirati special forces and 
including remnants of Yemeni government troops, 
South Yemeni separatists, local and tribal militias, 
and even Salafist units. The latter are regarded by 
Abu Dhabi as less dangerous than Islamists from 
Muslim Brotherhood circles because they are loyal 
to the existing state authorities. 
By May 2017 at the latest, however, this alliance 
broke down due to a conflict between the Hadi gov-
ernment and the separatists. The conflict was a direct 
consequence of the divergence of interests between 
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which gained in importance 
in the course of the war. Saudi Arabia relied on co-
operation with the al-Islah party, which represents 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen. Al-Islah is an 
alliance of Islamists, tribal militias and Salafists, and 
was the most important opponent of the Houthis 
from 2011 to 2013. When Riyadh decided in 2013 
to join forces with the UAE to fight the Muslim 
Brotherhood throughout the region, it also withdrew 
its support from al-Islah. This was one reason why the 
Houthi-Saleh alliance was able to inflict a crushing 
defeat on the party and allied tribes in the following 
year, 2014. From 2015 on, Riyadh once more worked 
together with the Islamists, since it saw no other way 
of deciding the conflict in its favour. Abu Dhabi, on 
the other hand, refused any cooperation with al-Islah, 
and UAE troops are said to have brutally persecuted 
Muslim Brothers in the areas that they and their allies 
controlled.96 
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In contrast to the Saudis, the Emirati troops relied 
on the militias they had formed in South Yemen. 
Their most important local ally was the Security Belt 
Forces (Quwwat al-Hizam al-Amni), a militia set up by 
the UAE in 2016 which operated mainly in Aden and 
the southwest.97 UAE units also trained and supported 
two armed groups called the Hadhrami elite (an-Nukh-
ba al-Hadhramiya) and Shabwani elite (an-Nukhba 
al-Shabwaniya), which were deployed in their respec-
tive home provinces of Hadhramaut and Shabwa.98 
The UAE thus relied on units whose commanders 
openly fought for an independent South Yemeni 
state, making conflicts between Abu Dhabi and the 
Saudi Arabia-backed Hadi government inevitable. 
The UAE eventually withdrew its initial support. Hadi 
and his senior followers were mostly in exile in Saudi 
Arabia from 2015 onwards; in February 2017, ten-
sions erupted spectacularly when, during a visit to 
Abu Dhabi, Hadi reportedly accused Mohammed Bin 
Zayed’s UAE of acting “like an occupying power” in 
Yemen.99 The conflict escalated further when Hadi 
dismissed Aidarus al-Zubaidi, the UAE-loyal governor 
of Aden, at the end of April. In May, al-Zubaidi, to-
gether with other leading separatists, founded the 
Southern Transitional Council (al-Majlis al-Intiqali 
al-Janubi, STC), which is working towards the estab-
lishment of an independent state of South Yemen and 
has positioned itself as the UAE’s most important 
client in Yemen. In January 2018, fighting broke out 
in Aden, during which the separatists, with the help 
of the Emirates, were able to prevail against Hadi 
loyalists and take control of the city.100 
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In 2018, there were frequent reports that the UAE 
wanted to end the war in Yemen. Since late 2015, 
none of the warring parties had been able to gain 
any decisive advantages. The Houthi-Saleh alliance 
was able to hold on to the northern highlands and 
the capital Sanaa without any difficulty, while the 
Saudi-Arabian-Emirati alliance dominated the south. 
The Emirates’ efforts to persuade Ali Abdullah 
Saleh to break with the Houthis also failed when the 
rebels assassinated the former president in December 
2017 – and showed no signs of weakness in the 
aftermath either. In a possibly last attempt to force 
a decision, coalition forces led by the UAE military 
launched an offensive against Hodeidah on the west 
coast of Yemen in June 2018. The port city was sig-
nificant because it was the only remaining way to 
supply the northern highlands, though the sea 
blockade made supplies completely inadequate. 
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi apparently hoped to force 
the Houthis to negotiate by conquering Hodeidah.101 
Although the coalition managed to penetrate the 
outskirts of the city, the international community’s 
resistance to the offensive intensified over the fol-
lowing months. The risk seemed too great that the 
capture could lead to a further deterioration of 
the already catastrophic humanitarian situation in 
northern Yemen. Another reason for the growing 
interest that the world was taking in the conflict 
at the time was the murder of Saudi journalist and 
regime critic Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in October 
2018. The US Congress in particular wanted to in-
crease pressure on Saudi Arabia and the UAE after 
the Trump administration, immediately after taking 
office, resumed the delivery of precision-guided 
munitions kits, which had been stopped by Obama, 
and refused to react to the murder of Khashoggi. On 
13 December 2018, the US Senate passed a resolution 
calling on the US to stop all military support for the 
war in Yemen.102 This pressure from Washington was 
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probably the most important reason why Riyadh and 
Abu Dhabi agreed to a ceasefire for the province of 
Hodeidah in December 2018 during negotiations held 
under the auspices of the UN in Stockholm.103 
However, implementing the agreement proved dif-
ficult. In Hodeidah there was virtually no more fight-
ing, but armed conflicts broke out again in other 
parts of the country. Despite this, in May 2019 it 
seemed that progress was being made, as the Houthis 
announced their withdrawal from Hodeidah. In May 
and June, however, the rebels resumed their attacks 
on Saudi targets, which they had largely stopped six 
months earlier, with renewed intensity. As of 2018, 
they had increasingly used drones and cruise missiles 
of Iranian manufacture, a sign that Tehran had aug-
mented its arms supplies to the Houthis both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively. Just how threatening the 
new weapon systems were became apparent in June 
2019, when the Houthis attacked the civilian airport 
of Abha in south-western Saudi Arabia with cruise mis-
siles.104 In August 2019, the UAE was forced to accept 
that these weapon systems also posed a threat to its ter-
ritory, when rebels attacked a Saudi Arabian oil field 
near the Emirati border.105 These events were evidence 
that the war, which had been intended to prevent 
the emergence of a “Yemeni Hezbollah”, had in fact 
turned the Houthis into an enemy who threatened 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE by straightforward means. 
Moreover, in the course of the conflict the Houthis 
became increasingly dependent on Iran, their sole 
supporter. An incident on 14 September 2019 made 
this abundantly clear. On that day, the Saudi oil 
facilities of Abqaiq and Khurais were attacked with 
drones and cruise missiles, resulting in the temporary 
loss of more than half of the country’s daily oil pro-
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/yemen-saudi-
war-pompeo-mattis.html (accessed 20 January 2020). 
103 Declan Walsh, “Yemen Cease-Fire Takes Effect: Why 
Now and What’s Next?”, The New York Times, 18 December 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/world/middleeast/ 
yemen-cease-fire.html?module=inline (accessed 20 January 
2020). 
104 Vivian Yee, “Houthis Strike Saudi Airport, Escalating 
Yemen Conflict”, The New York Times, 12 June 2019, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/world/middleeast/saudi-
airport-attack.html (accessed 20 January 2020). 
105 Caleb Weiss, “Houthis Claim Major Drone Operation 
Near the UAE”, The Long War Journal, 17 August 2019, https:// 
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/08/houthis-claim-
major-drone-operation-near-the-uae.php (accessed 20 Janu-
ary 2020). 
 Isolating Qatar 
 SWP Berlin 
 Regional Power United Arab Emirates 
 July 2020 
 27 
duction. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the 
attack. However, US intelligence services concluded 
that the drones and cruise missiles had been fired 
from Iranian territory.106 The fact that the Houthis 
helped to cover up Iran’s authorship, thereby risking 
countermeasures not only by the Saudis and Emiratis 
but also by the USA, illustrates the extent to which 
they had become a Tehran proxy, and the extent to 
which they had subordinated (or been forced to sub-
ordinate) their own interests to their protector’s. 
By this time, the UAE had already withdrawn most 
of its troops from Yemen. In July 2019, they had an-
nounced that they would end the war in Yemen and 
recall the majority of their forces.107 Therefore, ground 
operations against the Houthis were no longer pos-
sible. The official reason given by the Emirates was 
a show of support for the Stockholm negotiations. 
Some observers suspected that the leadership in Abu 
Dhabi was withdrawing its troops in the context of 
the escalating conflict between the USA and Iran so 
as to protect the Emirates themselves if necessary. 
Another assumption was that the Iranian attacks on 
ships near the Strait of Hormuz in May and June 2019 
had made the Emirates aware of their own vulner-
ability, and that Abu Dhabi had wanted to send a 
signal of détente towards Tehran. 
This is in line with the fact that the UAE did not 
publicly blame Iran for the damage to the tankers and 
that Emirati officials held talks with Tehran on the 
safety of shipping around the Strait of Hormuz.108 
Another reason for the withdrawal may also have 
been that the UAE had achieved important goals in 
Yemen: not only did militias allied with the Emirates 
dominate large parts of South Yemen; these groups 
had also demonstrated their strength in August when 
they (once again) expelled supporters of the Hadi gov-
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ernment from Aden.109 The UAE and/or its local allies 
also continued to control all major ports from the 
Omani border to the island of Perim at the entrance 
to the Red Sea, as well as the island of Socotra. 
Isolating Qatar 
The UAE’s policy towards the neighbouring emirate 
of Qatar combines the two key elements of Abu 
Dhabi’s regional policy: fighting the Islamists and 
containing Iran. Since 2011 Qatar has become the 
most important supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the Arab world alongside Turkey, and despite its 
small size and lack of military power has tried to pur-
sue an active regional policy. On the other hand, 
despite its alliance with the USA and the other Arab 
Gulf states, Doha has endeavoured to maintain the 
best possible relations with Iran. This course of action 
has led to a conflict between Qatar on the one hand 
and the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other states on the 
other, which escalated to a full blockade of Qatar by 
its neighbours in 2017. 
While Saudi Arabia disliked Qatar’s 
friendly relations with Iran, the UAE 
was particularly disturbed by Doha’s 
benevolent treatment of Islamists. 
Qatar is the smallest Gulf Cooperation Council 
state after Bahrain. Until the 1990s, the emirate’s for-
eign policy was oriented towards Saudi Arabia. This 
changed, however, when Emir Hamad Ibn Khalifa 
Al Thani took office in 1995. During his reign (until 
2013), he massively pushed the exploitation and 
export of the country’s huge gas reserves. Within a 
few years, Qatar became the world’s largest exporter 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG).110 Qatar’s natural gas 
comes from the largest known field on earth, a field 
it shares with Iran. As exploitation continues, Qatar’s 
and Iran’s production facilities will move closer to 
each other, making it advisable for Qatar to cooperate 
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with Iran. For this reason, Emir Hamad Ibn Khalifa 
relied on US protection – since 2003, American 
fighter planes have been stationed at the important 
air base in Qatar’s al-Udaid – and also maintained 
close relations with Tehran. From 2005 onwards, the 
Qatari leadership also attempted to mediate in con-
flicts between Iran’s allies and their opponents in 
Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Sudan so as 
to prevent escalation and establish itself as an indis-
pensable mediator.111 Doha accepted that Riyadh and 
Abu Dhabi, who always viewed Iran’s policy in the re-
gion with suspicion, disapproved of the Qatari strategy. 
While Saudi Arabia perceived Qatar’s friendly 
relations with Iran as particularly problematic, the 
UAE primarily criticised Doha’s benevolent treatment 
and promotion of Islamists. Under the ruler Hamad 
Ibn Khalifa, the small emirate had become an increas-
ingly important exile for Muslim Brothers from sev-
eral Arab countries. With the news channel al-Jazeera, 
founded in 1996, which rapidly developed into the 
most popular medium in the Arab world, Islamists 
also gained a public forum. Again and again, the gov-
ernments of the region, who were not used to public 
criticism, protested against the broadcasts from Doha. 
Until 2011, these neighbours regarded such activities 
as a nuisance more than a real problem. However, 
with the start of the Arab Spring, the UAE increasingly 
perceived Qatar’s policies as threatening. One reason 
was its mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood at home. 
From the Emirates’ perspective, by promoting the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Doha supported a movement 
which threatened the stability of the Federation. 
Moreover, from the second half of 2011, Qatar iden-
tified Islamists as the political force of the future in 
many countries of the Arab world and began to sup-
port the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the al-Nahda 
party in Tunisia, al-Islah in Yemen, and Islamist in-
surgents in Syria. This new focus for Qatari politics 
was also reflected in al-Jazeera news coverage, which 
increasingly sided with the Islamists in the region. 
While this already caused great discontent amongst 
all neighbours, it was Qatari policy towards Egypt in 
particular that convinced Abu Dhabi to take action 
against the small emirate. In Egypt, Doha supported 
the government of President Mohammed Morsi with 
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billions in aid until 2013.112 The military coup that 
followed was a serious defeat for Qatar, since the 
Muslim Brotherhood allied with it was thereafter 
brutally persecuted, and relations between Cairo and 
Doha deteriorated dramatically.113 This in turn was 
mainly due to the fact that many Muslim Brothers 
fled Egypt to Doha.114 The fall of Morsi was also a 
turning point in the conflict with the UAE, which 
from 2013 onwards tried to push back Qatar’s in-
fluence in the Arab world and beyond. 
Subsequently, the UAE and Saudi Arabia increased 
the pressure on the emirate. In March 2014 Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambas-
sadors from Doha. Alongside this, the three states 
published lists of terrorist organisations at different 
times during the year, each of which included the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and many groups from 
its circle that Qatar had supported until then. The 
Qatari leadership finally gave in and called on some 
Muslim Brotherhood officials to leave Doha. As a 
result, the conflict subsided somewhat and the am-
bassadors returned to the Qatari capital in November 
2014.115 However, it quickly became clear that the 
Qatari leadership – now under the new Emir, Tamim 
Ibn Hamad Al Thani – did not intend to fundamen-
tally change its regional policy. This was evidenced by 
its actions in Libya, where militias supported by Qatar 
played a major role in the Dawn coalition and the 
capture of Tripoli in summer 2014. 
The rise of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin 
Salman after 2015 and the assumption of office by 
Donald Trump in January 2017 improved the context 
for the UAE such that it could make another attempt 
to force Qatar to relent. Moreover, many observers 
believe that US President Trump encouraged Abu 
Dhabi and Riyadh to take this step. Trump visited 
Riyadh on 20 and 21 May 2017, just before the next 
crisis, and met with Mohammed Bin Zayed. The fact 
that an American president’s first trip abroad after 
his inauguration was to Saudi Arabia was already 
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unusual and could only be explained by effective 
Saudi and Emirati lobbying in Washington.116 Since, 
during the visit, Donald Trump reaffirmed his inten-
tion to put into practice the anti-Iranian strategy 
announced in his election campaign, and saw Saudi 
Arabia as an important ally for this policy, it is quite 
possible that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi felt encouraged 
to take action against Qatar first.117 
The conflict escalated with the liberation of Qatari 
hostages in Iraq in April 2017, which, according to 
press reports, was linked to millions of dollars in 
payments to the Iraqi Shiite militia Hezbollah Bat-
talions (Kata’ib Hezbollah) and the Syrian al-Nusra 
Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), both organisations on the 
UAE’s 2014 terrorism list.118 For its regional neigh-
bours, the payment was further proof that Doha was 
supporting terrorists. In response, the UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the – admittedly power-
less – Yemeni government decided to take a drastic 
step to put Qatar in its place. On 5 June 2017, they 
severed diplomatic relations, imposed a total block-
ade on the emirate, and closed its land, air and sea 
borders. With the exception of Egypt, all the states 
mentioned above also ordered their citizens to leave 
Qatar.119 Days later, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh confront-
ed the Qatari government with demands that they 
wanted to see fulfilled within ten days before 
they would lift the blockade. Among other things, 
they demanded that the leadership in Doha revoke 
al-Jazeera’s licence, reduce its relations with Iran, 
and close a Turkish military base on its territory.120 
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If Qatar had accepted the demands, this would 
have meant the end of its independent foreign policy. 
It is possible that Abu Dhabi and Riyadh were even 
aiming to overthrow Emir Tamim Al Thani. The 
situation was so dramatic in the first few days that 
the US military briefly feared a Saudi Arabian inva-
sion might ensue. This failed to materialise, and the 
government in Doha refused to bow to pressure from 
its neighbours. Instead, it spent billions of dollars 
securing provisions for the Qatari population, inten-
sified its relations with Turkey and Iran, and con-
tinued its regional policy as best it could.121 In Libya, 
Qatar together with Turkey continued to support the 
unity government and other opponents of the UAE – 
even though Doha reduced its aid while Ankara in-
creased it.122 The emirate’s unwillingness to give in 
to the demands of its neighbours was also evident in 
East Africa. In 2018, Qatar used a crisis between the 
government of Somalia and the UAE to develop its 
relations with Mogadishu. In 2015, the UAE military 
had begun training Somali special forces to fight 
the al-Shabab jihadists. However, a dispute with the 
Somali government had already arisen in 2017 
because Abu Dhabi had set up a base in the port of 
Berbera in Somaliland, which is de facto independent 
but legally part of Somalia, and promised to train the 
army and police there.123 The UAE reacted to Moga-
dishu’s protests by terminating its training mission 
for the Somali military in the spring. From then on, 
Abu Dhabi concentrated its aid on Somaliland and 
autonomous Puntland, where the Emirati company 
DP World has been managing and expanding the port 
of Bosaso since 2017. Qatar immediately stepped in 
and expanded its support for the Somali government 
in Mogadishu.124 In early 2020, there were no signs 
of a relaxation between the UAE and Qatar. 
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The events in Somaliland and Puntland are also evi-
dence of another important dimension of UAE regional 
policy: the Emirates’ efforts to bring the main ports 
around the Gulf of Aden under their control. The pur-
pose of this maritime expansion is not entirely clear, 
as the UAE is pursuing a twin-track approach. On the 
one hand, the Emirati Navy is setting up military 
bases, and on the other hand the Dubai-based com-
pany DP World is taking over the modernisation, 
expansion and management of ports. The objectives 
of this policy are likely to be both geopolitical and 
commercial. 
This expansion of the UAE began with the war 
in Yemen and the capture of the port city of Aden in 
2015. In the following years the Emirati military, 
together with its Yemeni allies, conquered all major 
ports of the country except Hodeidah, including 
Mukalla and Shihr. The fact that the UAE also took 
control of the Yemeni islands of Perim (at the en-
trance to the Red Sea) and Socotra (at the entrance to 
the Gulf of Aden) made the geopolitical focus of its 
strategy visible. In the first months of the war, the 
UAE military also established a base on the East 
African coast opposite Yemen. The first choice was 
Djibouti, whose civilian port DP World had already 
deepened and modernised in the 2000s.125 In the 
spring of 2015, the Emirati leadership therefore 
planned to make Djibouti the starting point for the 
war in Yemen. However, a conflict between Emirati 
diplomats and the head of the Djibouti air force in 
April of the same year led to a breakdown of diplo-
matic relations and forced the UAE to change its 
plans. The UAE now relied on the Eritrean Assab, 
where the Emirati military, in return for generous aid 
to the host country, expanded the disused deep-sea 
port and the nearby air base as bases for the war in 
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Yemen, and used them intensively in the following 
years.126 
When the UAE subsequently expanded its presence 
in the Somali ports of Berbera and Bosaso, it became 
clear that it was preparing for a longer-term stay 
around the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. 
This did not change even after the withdrawal of 
most UAE troops from Yemen in 2019, since the Emir-
atis retained control of several ports and islands, leav-
ing a small contingent in Aden for the time being. 
Moreover, where UAE troops withdrew, the militias 
allied with them stayed behind. These militias are 
heavily dependent on Emirati support, so Abu Dhabi 
seems to assume that they will remain loyal in the 
future. 
All around the Gulf of Aden, the 
UAE have now created a 
small maritime empire. 
The goal of this Emirati expansion is likely to be 
military and economic. With a continued presence 
in the ports around the Gulf of Aden, the UAE can 
intervene in Yemen at any time. Simultaneously, the 
management of the many ports by DP World serves 
the commercial interests of the UAE; the Emirates are 
banking on diversification and want to prevent tran-
shipment points on the south coast of the Arabian 
Peninsula or in the Horn of Africa from becoming a 
competitor to their own major port of Jebel Ali. Con-
sidering all the sites outside its national territory that 
the UAE controls militarily or economically, it is 
obvious that it has created a small maritime empire 
around the edge of the Gulf of Aden. 
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Whether or not the Emirates’ expansion has 
already reached its limits will only become apparent 
in the coming years. The partial withdrawal from 
Yemen is an indication that the UAE initially intends 
to act more cautiously. At the same time, beyond its 
presence in several ports and strategically important 
islands, there are also signs that the UAE is showing 
continued interest in the Red Sea. Perhaps the most 
important is its engagement in Sudan. Since the 
beginning of the war in Yemen, Abu Dhabi sought 
to strengthen cooperation with the regime of Omar 
al-Bashir, which provided mercenaries to the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia.127 However, Bashir also maintained 
good relations with Turkey and Qatar.128 Abu Dhabi 
and Riyadh ultimately prevailed over their rivals 
when Bashir was overthrown and arrested by the 
military in April 2019 after months of popular pro-
test. The two Gulf States pledged $3 billion to the 
newly formed military council in Khartoum to sta-
bilise Sudan. According to press reports, the military 
leadership also arrested Islamists from Bashir’s en-
tourage who are close to Qatar and Turkey.129 How-
ever, protests continued and, following a massacre 
of more than 100 demonstrators by the Rapid Support 
Forces (Quwwat ad-Da’m al-Sari’) of the powerful 
General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti) on 3 
June, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appear to have urged the 
Military Council to adopt a more moderate course.130 
The ensuing talks between the rulers and the oppo-
sition movement culminated in an agreement that 
provides for a joint transitional government for the 
next three years.131 In Sudan, as in Egypt, the UAE’s 
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main concern after the overthrow of the authoritarian 
regime is likely to be to ensure that the military 
remains a force of political stability and to prevent 
representatives of any protest movement from assum-
ing full power. All in all, it is obvious that since 2015 
the Emirates have been showing an increased mili-
tary, political and economic presence along the route 
from the Gulf of Oman via the Gulf of Aden to the 
Red Sea and the Suez Canal. This indicates that, 
beyond the fight against the Islamists, they are pur-
suing a geopolitical vision aimed at co-control of the 
sea routes around the Arabian Peninsula. 
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The partial withdrawal of its armed forces from 
Yemen was accompanied by visible efforts by the UAE 
to reduce tensions with Iran. Already after the first 
attacks on tankers in May 2019, the Emirati Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, who 
often acts as the mouthpiece of the UAE government 
in such instances, repeatedly called for a de-escalation 
and held to this line even after Iran shot down an 
American drone in June 2019: “Tensions in the Gulf 
can only be addressed politically. Crisis long in the 
making requires collective attention; primarily to de 
escalate & to find political solutions thru dialogue & 
negotiations. Regional voices important to achieve 
sustainable solutions.”132 Foreign Minister Abdullah 
Bin Zayed also expressed similar views on several 
occasions. This heralded the end of a phase of Emirati 
policy that had begun in 2011 and during which the 
UAE, together with Saudi Arabia, had attempted to 
limit and, if possible, reduce Iran’s growing influence 
in the region with sometimes aggressive action. 
An important motive for the more active regional 
policy that the UAE decided to adopt at the beginning 
of the decade was the perception by the Abu Dhabi 
government that it could no longer rely on the Obama 
administration, since the latter was not interested 
in the stability of pro-Western governments and was 
working towards a balance with Tehran. Similarly, the 
Trump administration’s unwillingness to take mili-
tary action against Iran in 2019 may also have played 
a role in the decision to de-escalate. The events in May 
and June 2019 in the Gulf of Oman and the Straits of 
Hormuz had made Abu Dhabi aware of how vulner-
able the Emirates’ economy was, and how aggressively 
the Iranian leadership could take action against US 
allies without having to worry about retaliation. The 
Emirates feared that they would not be protected by 
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the US in the event of a conflict because it was 
becoming increasingly clear that the Trump adminis-
tration, despite all its rhetoric, was shying away from 
a military confrontation with Iran. 
In the months that followed, the Emirati leader-
ship held to this line and tried not to provoke Iran. 
But while Abu Dhabi held talks with Tehran on mari-
time security in August, it decided to join the US-led 
naval mission to ensure the safety of civilian shipping 
from Iranian assaults following the attacks on the 
Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities.133 Nor was it a purely 
conciliatory signal that the UAE withdrew its remain-
ing troops from Aden in October to facilitate a peace 
agreement between the Hadi government and Abu 
Dhabi-backed separatists, which was reached in No-
vember. This move was aimed at restoring the unity 
of the Houthis’ Yemeni opponents.134 It remained 
unclear whether the ulterior motive was to continue 
the war or to emphasise the unity of the pro-Saudi 
and pro-Emirati camp in the peace talks between 
Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Oman that followed. 
Overall, however, the UAE seems to have no interest 
in further escalation for the time being. Meanwhile, 
Emirati politicians have held fast to their demands for 
de-escalation and political solutions to the conflicts in 
the region.135 That this was more than mere rhetoric 
was demonstrated by the UAE’s reaction to the tar-
geted killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guard General 
Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad in early January 2020. 
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Gargash again made a verbose appeal to all those in-
volved to avoid confrontation.136 Whether the UAE 
will maintain this stance if the conflict between 
Washington and Tehran escalates further cannot yet 
be determined. 
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The rise of the UAE to a regional power has made the 
country a more important and simultaneously a more 
problematic partner for German and European policy 
in and towards the Middle East. The Emirates are 
more important today above all because they influ-
ence the political situation in many more countries 
(and conflicts) than before 2011, including the Gulf 
States and Yemen, as well as Somalia, Eritrea, Ethio-
pia, Sudan, Egypt and Libya. In relation to Iran, too, 
they are one of the most significant Middle Eastern 
actors, and one that also has influence on the Trump 
administration. Nevertheless, the UAE is more prob-
lematic than before 2011 because its goals, strategies 
and means are often not compatible with those of 
Germany and Europe. This applies, for example, to its 
conduct in the Yemen war, a war that destroyed the 
country and made Iran a key player there in the first 
place. But it also applies to the promotion of coups 
d’état such as that by General al-Sisi in Egypt; support 
for the military against the protest movement in 
Sudan; and aid for General Haftar in Libya in his fight 
against the unity government. Since mid-2019, how-
ever, Abu Dhabi has visibly been working towards 
de-escalation and also towards talks with Tehran. 
This could indicate that it has come to the conclusion 
that it may have overblown its aggressive approach 
towards Iran. This should eliminate at least one sig-
nificant difference of opinion between the UAE and 
Europe. 
Despite all the problems, closer political relations 
with the UAE should be an important goal of German 
Middle East policy. The geopolitical focus of the Middle 
East has shifted eastwards since the 1970s – from 
Israel and Egypt to the Persian Gulf. As a result of this 
shift, the Gulf States have become more important 
and the UAE is Germany’s main partner there, along-
side Saudi Arabia. The frequent differences of opinion 
between Berlin and Abu Dhabi are due to the fact 
that the Emirati government’s worldview is strongly 
based on security policy categories. Since the US 
under President Obama distanced itself from its 
allies in the Gulf, conflicts between the Emirates 
and Europe have intensified because the UAE has fre-
quently opposed with considerable aggressiveness 
the rise of Islamists in the region and the expansion 
of Iran, alone or in alliance with Saudi Arabia. This 
should not cloud the fact that Germany and the UAE 
have partly congruent interests. 
A particularly important common interest is that 
of combating Islamist terrorism. The UAE is an impor-
tant and reliable partner in this area, since it is fight-
ing transnational groups such as the IS and al Qaida 
resolutely and effectively. One problem is that Abu 
Dhabi cooperates with Salafist forces in Yemen, and 
also in Libya, so long as they claim to be loyal part-
ners who do not want to carry the armed struggle 
beyond their home country. One task for Germany 
and the EU should be to convince the Emirates of the 
dangers of such an approach, because the Salafists 
they support and the jihadists they fight, such as IS 
or al-Qaida, differ only in nuances. Another problem 
is that the Emirates’ concept of terrorism is much 
broader and includes the Muslim Brotherhood. Here, 
Germany and Europe should firmly disagree and 
make clear that the Muslim Brotherhood as a whole 
cannot be categorised as terrorist, because it does not 
use violence. The situation is different for Shiite 
Islamists, who are also listed as terrorist organisations 
by the UAE. Germany and Europe should consider 
whether Abu Dhabi does not in some cases have a 
more realistic view of these groups. This applies, for 
example, to Iraqi Shiite militias such as Asa’ib Ahl al-
Haqq and Kata’ib Hezbollah. They are undoubtedly 
terrorist organisations and should be pursued as such 
by Europeans as well. 
Common policy interests can also be identified 
concerning Iran. There is evidently significant dissent 
over the nuclear agreement – the UAE has welcomed 
the US withdrawal, while the Europeans continue to 
support the treaty. However, Tehran’s continued an-
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nouncements (most recently in January 2020) that it 
will expand uranium enrichment beyond the limits 
set out in the agreement could remove the basis for 
European policy, and make the question of what 
other means can be used to prevent Iran from acquir-
ing nuclear weapons more urgent. The UAE will then 
be an important interlocutor. Furthermore, Iran has 
significantly increased its influence in the Arab world 
since 2011, mostly in cooperation with Shiite Islamist 
groups that have committed numerous crimes against 
their opponents and the civilian population, and 
undermined states such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and 
Yemen from within. Germany and Europe have an 
interest in preventing this expansion as well as Iran’s 
continued missile armament. Since the Iranian 
attacks on oil tankers in June and the attack on Saudi 
Arabian oil facilities in September 2019, Tehran has 
also jeopardised the security of oil exports. The Gulf 
States must protect themselves against their aggres-
sive neighbour, and it is therefore both important and 
logical that the UAE should continue to expand and 
modernise its military. Arms exports to the Emirates 
should therefore continue to be permitted and, if 
necessary, be expanded. 
Abbreviations 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council  
IS Islamic State 
LNA Libyan National Army 
LNG liquefied natural gas 
MESA Middle East Strategic Alliance 
STC Southern Transitional Council  
(al-Majlis al-Intiqali al-Janubi; Yemen) 
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defence 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UN United Nations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
